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ARTICLES

THE CURRENT LIFE INSURANCE CRISIS: HOW THE
LAW SHOULD RESPOND
KYLE

D. LOGUE*

Defend the Cause of the fatherless, plead the case of the widow.
Isaiah 1:17
INTRODUCTION

Imagine a household consisting of a wife and husband
with two small children. One of the spouses is the "primary
earner" (in the sense of being the one who earns the most
income); the other spouse is either the "secondary earner" or
stays at home with the children. Assume further that the
family, which is wholly dependent financially on the wages of
the spouses or of the single primary earner, has enough income
to cover the household's current expenses and to begin saving
for the couple's retirement. They even make enough to set
aside a little cash each year for the children's college fund, and
are slowly saving to make a down payment on a house (or
maybe they recently bought a house and are just beginning to
make payments on the mortgage). Things are going well. Life
is good.
Then disaster strikes.
The primary earner dies
unexpectedly, either from a sudden illness or an accident.
What happens to the surviving members of the family? Aside
from the obvious grief and psychological trauma associated
with such an event, what happens to them financially? Does
their standard of living plummet, or are they able to maintain
some semblance of continuity from their previous life to their
new one?
The answer depends largely on whether the
household (typically the primary earner himself or herself) at
some point had decided to buy life insurance on his or her life.
If there is too little life insurance coverage, the family may be
forced to change their lives drastically, abandoning the college
·Professor of Law, University of Michigan. I appreciate helpful comments from
participants at the 1999 Harvard Law SChool Seminar on Current Research in Tax
Policy and the Michigan Law and Economics Workshop.
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aspirations for their children and perhaps having to move to a
smaller, less expensive home (or maybe giving up the hope of
the newer, larger home for which they had been planning).
Furthermore, the surviving spouse may be forced to take a
second job or change careers or, if he or she had been a stay-at
home spouse, to join the labor force and therefore alter
drastically the family's plan for how the children would be
raised. At the extreme, an inadequately insured household in
such a situation would, despite the existence of social safety
nets, be pushed into a state of profound and persistent
poverty.1
This hypothetical suggests the importance of thinking
carefully about one's (and one's dependents') life insurance
needs. Such thinking does not provide easy answers; rather, it
only suggests more questions: Under what circumstances
Clearly, the
should a household buy life insurance?
hypothetical
household
described
above
needs
some
protection, but whom else? On whose life should the policy be
purchased? How much coverage is appropriate? What type of
policy is best? The problem is that these are questions that
most of us try to ignore most of the time. True enough, there
may be a brief period in our lives when we give the idea of
buying life insurance some sustained thought, such as when
we get married or when we have our first child. We may even
return t o the topic, at least cursorily, each time we receive a
cold call from a life insurance agent. Still, it seems safe to say
that the vast majority of us, most of the ti me, try to put life
insurance questions out of our minds. By contrast, however,
we seem to be growing increasingly obsessed with our
investment portfolios, whether they be held inside or outside
our 401(k) or Roth IRA plans. And on-line stock trading has
become all the rage, even (and perhaps especially) for the most
unsophisticated investors.
So why the reluctance to consider life insurance? The
1 See, e.g., Michael D. Hurd & David A. Wise, The Wealth and Poverty of Widows:
Assets Before and After the Husband's Death, in THE ECONOMICS OF AGING 177
(David A. Wise ed., 1989) (discussing the high incidence of poverty among

widows and exploring extent to which poverty status arises as direct result of
death of husband); see also CHERYL D. RETZLOFF, LLIF, ACS, ET. AL 1998 SURVIVOR
STUDY: THE FINANCIAL IMPACT OF DEATH 5-18 Gudith R. Kulak, 1998) (In cases in
which the primary earner dies as the result of an extended illness, it appears the
resulting poverty (or reduction in living standards) is a function not oruy of
inadequate life insurance coverage but also less than full health and disability
insurance).
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obvious answer is that thinking about life insurance is much
less enjoyable than thinking about our investments. Life
insurance planning, as with all estate planning, requires us to
contemplate our own mortality; whereas, in contrast, thinking
about lifetime savings-the money we stow away each month in
savings accounts, mutual funds, or individual stocks-enables
us to daydream about the exotic locations we will visit in our
retirement or the fancy colleges our children will one day
attend. Or maybe the problem is that most of us hate the
process by which life insurance has traditionally been
marketed, with face-to-face interrogations by earnest but
sometimes overeager life insurance agents, followed by a
special medical examination that might include blood and
urine tests. The privacy concerns raised by such medical tests,
especially when conducted by or for the benefit of insurance
companies, increasingly have become a source of acute anxiety
for many. In any event, the following assertion seems true: we
generally regard the topic of life insurance, and the process by
which is it purchased, to be unpleasant and best avoided when
possible.
That attitude, if pervasive, presents a profound problem. It
raises the concern that those households that need life
insurance most-for example, middle-income, wage-dependent
households with small children-have too little coverage. More
specifically, given the pervasively negative attitude towards
the life insuring process, we should expect that a) too few
households will buy life insurance on the lives of primary and
secondary earners as well as on other members of the
household, such as stay-at-home spouses, who provide
substantial services; b) of those households that do buy life
insurance, many will buy too little; and c) of those that buy
enough coverage initially, many will fail to update their
coverage to meet their changing needs. We would be right
about these expectations. Recent empirical research on the
subject suggests that there is widespread and substantial
underconsumption of life insurance.2 According to the most
2 Astonishingly little independent (that is, not industry-funded) research has
been done on the question of life-insurance adequacy. For the most
comprehensive ana sophisticated empirical study on the topic, see B. DOUGLAS
BERNHEIM, ET AL., THE ADEQUACY OF LIFE INSURANCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE HEALTH
AND RETIREMENT SURVEY (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
7372, 1999). Before that paper, the leading studies were a series ofarticles by
Alan J. Auerbach & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, see Alan J. Auerbach & Laurence J.
Kotlikoff, The Adequacy of Life Insurance Purchases, 1 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 215
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recent and most sophisticated study on the subject, fifty-five
percent of households sampled were underinsured on the life
of the primary earner, and twenty-one percent were
underinsured on the life of the secondary eamer.3
These
findings are consistent with findings of prior research, what
little exists. 4 Yet none of these studies examines the adequacy
of life insurance on the lives of nonwage-earning household
members, such as stay-at-home spouses. All of this evidence of
insurance inadequacy comes despite the fact that, in 1998 for
example, the per-household average amount of life insurance
(for those households who had some type of life insurance
policy) was $165,800.5 That may seem like a lot of money, but
it amounts to only 2.85 years worth of disposable income for
the average household-not much for a young family, recently
deprived of its primary or secondary earner, on which to live. 6
Even if true, why is this a regulatory concern? Why should
the law, or the government more generally, do anything in
response to this problem? The reasons are straightforward.
From the perspective of one concerned with maximizing
overall "social welfare,"7 it can easily be shown that society is
generally worse off when households fail to plan adequately
As described in the hypothetical,
for unexpected losses.
underinsurance can produce involuntary reductions in
standards of living, potentially below the poverty line in some
cases. Note also that this concern with maximizing social
welfare-and the worry that, with respect to life-insurance
(1991) [Hereafter Auerbach & Kotlikoff, Adequacy of Life Insurance]; see ALAN J.
AUERBACH & LAURENCE]. KOTLIKOFF, LIFE INSURANCE INADEQUACY-EVIDENCE
FROM A SAMPLE OF OLDER WI DOWS (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working

3765, 1991). [Hereafter Auerbach & Kotlikoff, Sample of Older
see Alan J. Averbach & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Life Insurance of the
Elderly: Its Adequacy and Detenninants, WORK, HEALTH, AND INCOME AMONG THE
ELDERLY 229 (Gary Burtless ed., 1987). As will be discussed more fully below, all

Paper No.
Widows];

of these studies find a substantial degree of underinsurance. These studies can
be contrasted with the hundreds of studies of savings behavior and adequacy
that have been conducted.
3 Bernheim, et al., supra note 2, at 24.
4 See sources supra note 2.
5 AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK at 12, TABLE
1.6 (1998). In 1997, Americans paid $115 billion in premiums to life insurance
companies. AMERICAN COUNOL OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK 64
(1998). By the end of 1997, the total amount of life insurance in force was
roughly $13.2 trillion. Id. at 2, table 1.1.

6 Id.
7 See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Human Welfare, 114
HARV. L. REV. 961 (2000) (arguing that public policy should be made solely on the

basis of effects on individual welfare).
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decision making, that goal is not achieved-is almost identical
with the concern that is presented by the problem of
insufficient retirement savings; that is, when households put
aside too little of current earnings to fund their desired post
retirement standard of living. The problem of undersaving,
however, has been widely acknowledged and exhaustively
studied. In fact, the whole point of all the various tax breaks
for retirement savings (IRAs and qualified pension plans),
indeed the main reason for the Social Security system, is to deal
with the problem of undersavings.8 Underconsumption of life
insurance presents a similar problem.
It reasonably can be argued that the problem of
underconsumption of life insurance potentially is of greater
concern than the problem of inadequate retirement savings.
Why so? Individuals who make retirement savings decisions
are, after all, deciding not only about the financial future of
their long-term dependents (and, by extension, their heirs) but
also about their own financial futures. They are deciding what
their standard of living will be as compared to their current
standard of living 20, 30, or 40 years down the road. Although
(as will be discussed further below) such a decision clearly
presents myopia and over-optimism concerns, at least the
decision maker is looking out for his or her own interests. With
life insurance, things are different.
The decision maker,
typically the head of the household, is put in the position of
looking out for the best interests of his or her dependents in
some future, hypothetical state of the world, and one in which
he or she (the insured, that is) will not be around to enjoy.
Though altruism surely motivates many to make just such
inter-temporal and state-dependent reallocations of resources,
surely altruism for most people, in their everyday lives, still
takes a backseat to self-interest. Put more concretely, when the
decision is whether to allocate the next dollar to consumption
today (a vacation, a new car, or a new stereo system today) or
to consumption at some point in the future (a vacation, a new
JULIA LYNN CORONADO, DON FULLERTON, & THOMAS GLASS, Long Rune Effects of
Social Security Reform Proposals on Lifetime Progressivity (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7568), (Feb. 2000) There is, of course, a
redistributive element to Social Security as well. The benefit formula is generally
considered highly progressive. However, when the regressive Social Security tax
is taken into account, as well as intergenerational and within household effects,
the overall Social Security system is only mildly progressive. This fact suggests
that the main reason for the system is forced savings. See id.
8
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car, or a new stereo system some years down the road), though
we are always worried about the tendency of the former to
trump the latter, that tendency will be greatest when the person
making the decision knows he or she will not be around to
enjoy the future vacation, car, or stereo.
Given these concerns, it is no surprise that our government
has
already
done something
about
the
tendency
to
underpurchase life insurance. The United States government
already spends a substantial amount of public money on the
life-insurance problem in the form of tax subsidies9 as well as
direct payments to widows, widowers, and orphans of
deceased workers in the form of Social Security survivorship
benefits.10
However, those expenditures turn out to be
That is, all of the empirical studies that have
inadequate.
examined the question have taken into account public
expenditures on life insurance, and still there is widespread
and substantial underinsurance.
This article explores some of the issues raised by the new
evidence of underinsurance. Part I explores the initial
theoretical question: why do people buy life insurance? Put
differently, what function does life insurance serve? Part II
provides some background on the life insurance market as it
currently exits. Thus, Part II summarizes the major types of life
insurance that are currently offered and summarizes the main
elements of the current regulatory regime for life insurance
companies. Part III then provides support for the claim that
households tend to drastically underconsume life insurance.
Section A of that Part summarizes the existing empirical
evidence,
which
finds
substantial
and
widespread
underinsurance. As I will point out, however, the scholars
conducting those studies take pains to avoid reaching any
normative conclusions based on their findings. In other words,

9 The Joint Committee on Taxation has estimated that in 2001 alone,
approximately $25 billion will be spent on federal income tax subsidies to

encourage the private purchase of life insurance. Those subsidies consist of the
income-tax exclusion for investment earnings on cash-value life insurance
policies (an estimated $23 billion tax expenditure f or 2001) and the exclusion for
employer-provided group-term life insurance ( an estimated $2 billion tax
expenditure). STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 107th CONG., ESTIMATES OF
FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURF5 FOR FISCAL YEARS 2001-2005, 18 Qoint Comm. Print
2001).
10 HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 105th CONG., 1998 GREEN BOOK 15 (Comm.
Print 1998) (describing the Old-Age, survivors, and disability Insurance (OASDI)
programs) [hereinafter GREEN BOOK].
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although
they
do
find
substantial
and
widespread
underinsurance, (almost paradoxically) they assert that such a
finding does not imply that too little insurance is being bought.
There is no paradox, however. The economists are simply
demonstrating their awareness of the theoretical difficulty of
specifying the "right" amount of life insurance coverage.
Although it is impossible to answer that question definitively,
in section B, this article favors a baseline that defines adequacy
as that amount of life insurance necessary to maintain the
survivors' standard of living, which happens to be the baseline
that the researchers used in their empirical studies.
That
standard-of-living baseline will be controversial in some circles
and, after a period of public debate, may be ultimately rejected.
That outcome would be perfectly acceptable, so long as the
debate takes place and households are forced to think seriously
about what the right amount of life insurance is for their needs.
Indeed, the main objective of this article is to start such a
discussion.
However, this article seeks to push the debate one step
beyond the adequacy question. Therefore, Part N reviews a
number of theoretical reasons why the economists' empirical
evidence should be given a normative slant; that is, why the
evidence should be interpreted as indicating a true
underinsurance
problem
and
why,
therefore,
further
government intervention may indeed be appropriate. These
"reasons to be worried" include the same sort of extemality
and behavioral rationales that have been offered for
government intervention in other contexts.
Finally, Part N builds on Parts II and III and assumes the
reader has been persuaded sufficiently of the existence of an
underinsurance problem to consider what the possible policy
responses might be. For those acquainted with the standard
debates regarding the funding and administration of social
insurance programs, this framework will be familiar.
For
example, Part N compares and contrasts the standard types of
policy tools that are available to deal with this sort of problem,
such as direct government provision, government mandates, or
government subsidies. The purpose of Part N, which draws
heavily from the existing literature on optimal subsidy design,
is not to provide a comprehensive legislative proposal, but
rather to sug.gest avenues of further inquiry.
This Part
concludes that a promising approach would involve either (a) a

C UMBERLAND LAW REVIEW
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combination of some minimal amount of government provided
term insurance (along the lines of what is currently provided
through Social Security survivorship benefits, although
perhaps made more widely available and with somewhat more
generous benefits) and a demand-side subsidy either in the
form of a deduction, a credit, or a voucher, or (b) a more
generous level of government-provided or government
mandated coverage, but with the possibility for households to
opt for less coverage.
Part IV also looks at the existing tax-subsidies for life
insurance-the exclusion for employer-provided term insurance
and the exclusion for investment earnings in cash-value life
insurance policies-and discusses how those rules might be
expanded to enhance the existing subsidy for life insurance
The most novel and potentially controversial
purchases.
suggestion in this Part is that, contrary to prior scholarly
analyses of the tax treatment of cash value life insurance, a case
can be made that, given the nature of the underinsurance
problem, those rules should be expanded rather than repealed,
as previous scholars have argued.
I. THE FUNCTION OF LIFE INSURANCE
A.

The

Demand for Insurance Generally

Why do people buy life insurance in the first place? It is
often said that the primary function of life insurance is to
protect one party's pecuniary interest in the life of another,
most often, to protect a family against the possibility of a
breadwinner's premature death.11 Can more be said about this
apparent need for economic security?
Economists and
psychologists have spent a great deal of effort over the years
studying human decision-making under conditions of risk and
uncertainty, and something (though not everything) can be
learned from the insights their studies have produced.
According to the standard economic account of insurance,
the purchase of an insurance policy by an individual is merely
one manifestation of a general characteristic of human nature:
namely, people seem to be "risk averse," at least with respect to
n See Kenneth Black, Jr. & Harrold D. Skipper, Jr. , Life Insurance 326-27 {12th
ed. 1994); and Emmett J. Vaughan & Therese Vaughan, Fundamentals of Risk
and Insurance 12-13 (1999).
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the possibility of large losses of the sort that insurance policies
typically cover. A risk averse party is someone who would
rather experience a certain loss (that is, pay an insurance
premium to an insurance company) than face an uncertain
prospect of equal expected value (that is, not buy the insurance
policy and take his chances).12 This observation has been
formalized into the concave utility-of-income curve that is
familiar to students of introductory microeconomics.13 The
intuition underlying that concave curve is that, although
individuals derive some utility from each new dollar received,
they derive less utility with each succeeding dollar. In such
situations, it could plausibly be argued that the relatively few
dollars that go to pay the insurance premiums are "less
costly" -less painful-for the individuals to lose (on a per
expected-dollar basis) than the much larger number of dollars
that would be lost in the event of an uninsured catastrophic
loss. In a sense, the idea of risk aversion is that not all dollars
are created equal: some of the dollars that go to pay an
uninsured catastrophic loss would have otherwise gone to
purchase "necessities," whereas all of the dollars that go to
purchase insurance come "off the top."14
In effect, then, an insurance policy can be understood as
providing a means by which a risk averse individual transfers
risk to an insurance company, which is assumed to be risk
neutral (or at least less risk averse than the insured). When an
individual purchases an insurance policy, she typically pays a
certain premium (which approximates her expected loss for the
period plus some loading charge) to the insurer, who agrees to

12

Someone who is "risk preferring" would rather take the uncertain bet than the
certain amount of equal expected value. The risk neutral party is indifferent
between the two, caring orily about the expected value of the options. For
accessible discussion of risk aversion and, more generally, the economic theory
of risk and insurance, see, e.g ., A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW
AND ECONOMICS 53-58 {1989); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT
LAW186-205 (1987) .
13 That standard economic account is based on the expected utility theory of Von
Neumman and Morgenstern. JOHN VON NE UMANN & OSKAR MORGENSfERN,
THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (1944).
t4 A similar rationale is used to justify redistributive taxation; that is, the policy of
progressive taxation is sometimes defended by reference to a hypothetical
concave social marginal-utility-of-income curve. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman &
Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive
Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1905, 1916-18 (1987) (explaining welfarist, ufilitarian
defense of progressive tax system).
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cover the loss in question if it occurs.15 Why is the insurer
willing to do this? Why is the insurer not also risk averse? The
The
answer lies largely in the concept of "risk pooling."
insurer collects similar premiums from numerous insureds
whose risk characteristics are essentially the same (in other
words, they pose the same ex ante estimated expected loss to
the pool) but whose risks are uncorrelated with one another.16
By pooling similar but independent risks in this way, the
insurer benefits from the law of large numbers, which in this
context says that the estimated loss payouts the insurer will
have to make to insureds will approach the actual payouts as
the size of the insurance pool increases. 17 Thus, in effect, the
sale of insurance policies by insurance companies to individual
insureds has the welfare-enhancing effect of actually reducing
societal risk.18
H the standard (rational actor) economic model can tell us
that risk averse individuals will want to buy insurance19 and
that insurance companies can, through risk pooling, satisfy that
demand, what can they tell us about how much insurance
1s With "retrospective" commercial insurance, however, only a portion of the
premium is certain. That is, the insured pays an initial premium at the beginning
of the insurance period (typically one year). Then, at ilie end of the period, the
premium is adjusted retrospectively to reflect the extent to which the loss
experience of the insurance pool (of which the insured is a member) happened to
diverge from what the insurer had predicted in setting the initial premium.
Retrospective insurance, as with many types of coinsurance arrangement,
amounts to a form of risk sharing between insured and insurer.
16 Risk pooling does not work so well if all of the members of the pool are subject
to the same risk-e.g., a hurricane insurance pool consisting entirely of houses in
Key West.
17 VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 11, at 15. "[B]y insuring a large number of
insureds posing homogeneous and independent risks, an insurer can reduce the
amount of variance in its expected losses to a very small range." KENNETH 5.
ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (3 ed. 2000).
18 George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort L«W, 96 YALE L.J.
1521 (1987). Because there are limitations on insurers' ability to reduce risk
through pooling, especially for potentially catastrophic losses, primary insurers
often will reinsure some portion of their risks with secondary or" reinsurance"
companies, so that the risl< pooling function can be taken to the next level.
vAUGHAN & vAUGHAN, supra note 11, at 146.
19 This is not to say, of course, that individuals who are risk averse with respect
to the possibility of large losses will be risk averse with respect to small losses.
For example, many people who buy insurance of various sorts against
catastrophic losses also buy lottery tickets. This observation has even been
formaliied. Applying the standard expected utility model, Friedman and Savage
showed that a utility function which is concave at low levels of wealth and
convex at high levels of wealth can explain why the same individual might buy
both an insurance policy and a lottery ticket. Milton Friedman & Leonard J.
Savage, The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279 (1948).
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individuals will buy and what those policies will look like?
That too is a question that economists have studied in depth,
but no definitive answers have been reached, unless one is
willing to make quite unrealistic assumptions about the state of
the world. For example, according to the standard model, the
purchase of "full" insurance coverage for a particular monetary
loss-coverage with no deductibles or coinsurance or caps
would be "rational," but only under a limited set of conditions,
such as the absence of loading costs as well as moral hazard
and adverse selection problems.
Given, therefore, the
prevalence of loading costs, moral hazard, and adverse
selection, the standard models suggest that rational insurance
policies would include something short of full coverage for
monetary losses.20
An important refinement of the standard economic
analysis of insurance demand takes into account the possibility
that some events cause not only monetary losses (that is, losses
for which there is a ready monetary equivalent) but also
nonmonetary losses (that is, losses for which there is no ready
monetary equivalent).21 For example, if an individual loses an
arm or a leg or, worse, a child in an accident, that individual
would obviously suffer a catastrophic nonmonetary loss as
well whatever monetary losses may be associated with such
tragedies. Indeed, in such cases, the nonmonetary loss will
constitute the majority (in some instances all) of the actual
harm.22
Whether individuals demand insurance against the
20 For example, applying the standard model, it has been shown that 1) if the
insurer is risk averse (and hence charges a disproportionately large loading

charge), the insured would prefer a policy that includes some element of
coinsurance; and 2) if the insurer is risk neutral (so that the loading charge is
proportional to the actuarial value of the risk), the insured would prefer a policy
with full coverage over some deductible. KENNETH}. ARROW, ESSAYS IN THE
THEORY OF RISK BEARING (1971).
21 In the literature, the terms "pecuniary" and "nonpecuniary" are often used to
describe what I am calling monetary and nonmonetary losses. See generally
Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain-and
Suffering Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1787 (1995).
22 With loss of a limb, medical expenses and possibly lost income would qualify
as monetary losses; but there clearly would be a large nonmonetary element as
well. That is, assuming he could get the money, the individual certainly would
be willing to pay more than the dIScounted present value of the future earnings
associatea with the limb to avoid the accident. With the loss of a child, no
substantial monetary loss may in fact occur. Rather, the entire loss may be of a
nonmonetary nature. Croley & Hanson, supra note 21, at 1884-85.
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possibility of such nonmonetary harm is an interesting and
difficult question. Applying a variant of the rational actor
model, scholars have concluded that the answer turns on
whether (and the extent to which) the event in question is
expected to alter the individual's marginal utility of money.23
On one hand, if the event is expected to have no effect on the
individual's marginal-utility-of-money (that is, the next dollar
in the "accident state of the world" is equal in value to the next
dollar in the "no-accident state of the world"), the individual
would ex ante demand full insurance against monetary losses
(again, assuming no loading costs) but no insurance against
nonmonetary losses.
On the other hand, if the event is
expected to increase the individual's marginal-utility-of-money
(all else equal), she would demand more than full monetary
loss insurance coverage. Finally, to complete the picture, if the
event is expected to reduce the individual's marginal-utility-of
money, less than full monetary-loss insurance would be
demanded.24
In sum, the standard economic theory of insurance tells us
that rational but risk-averse individuals will demand insurance
23 If an individual's utility function (the marginal utility of dollars) changes as a
result of a particular type of event (here, a nonmonetary loss of some sort), that
individual s utility function is said to be "state dependent." Philip J. Cook &
Daniel A. Graham, The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of
Irreplaceable Commodities, 91 Q. J. ECON. 143, 143-44 (1977).
24 STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW229-30 (1987). The
scholars who have studied this question often develop simple hypothetical
examples to illustrate the point. For example, one scholar offers the following
illustration:
Consider a business executive who runs recreationally and who loses a
foot in an accident. ...[T]he injury could increase the marginal utility of
money for this consumer if it caused her to substitute travel or the
symphony for running because these activities are more expensive.
Here marginal utility could fall, however, if she substitutes reading for
running.
Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97
YALEL.J. 353, 364 (1988). Thus, in the former case, the executive would ex ante
demand insurance for the loss of her foot in order to shift income (via the
insurance premium) from the non-injured state of the world to the injured state
of the world in which travel (which is an expensive pastime compared to
running) has become relatively attractive; whereas, in the latter case, she would
not demand insurance for the loss of her foot, but might in fact demand some
form of" disinsurance" (for example, less than full medical insurance for
amputation accidents) in order to keep more of her dollars in the non-injured
state of the world where they are relatively valuable. For a discussion of the
concept of, and a survey of the literature on disinsurance, see generally Croley &
Hanson, supra note 21, at 1800 n.47.
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to cover them against a possibility of harm; and the amount of
coverage (the fraction of the total potential loss that will be
covered) will be difficult to predict a priori. It will depend on,
among other things, whether there are severe moral hazard
and adverse selection problems (which suggest the rationality
of less-than-full coverage) and the effect of the potential harm
on the individual's marginal utility of money (which can go
either way).25
B.

The

Demand for Life Insurance

The foregoing survey of the theory of consumer demand
for insurance can, in one sense, be applied straightforwardly to
the life-insurance context. At first blush, we can analogize the
purchase of life insurance to the purchase of commercial
property insurance, for example.
Under this analogy, the
insured (the person whose death will trigger the payment of
the death benefit) is viewed as an income-generating asset,
whether the income is in the form of wages (for a breadwinner
insured) or household services (for a caregiver-insured). The
value of this human asset can be understood as the discounted
present value of all the insured's expected future monetary and
nonmonetary earnings (less the discounted present value of the
insured' s expected lifetime consumption expenditures on
himself or herself).26 Likewise, the analogue to the purchaser of
property insurance (the one seeking to shift the risk of losing
the asset from him- or herself to the insurer) would be the
beneficiary of the life insurance policy. This is the person
presumably who has a financial stake in the insured' s
continuing to live his or her normal life span.27 Therefore, if the
25 In fact, the story is somewhat more complex than that. Recent experimental

research in cognitive psychology has shown that human decision making
sometimes exfiibits persistent and perplexing anomalies-features that would not
be predicted by expected utility theory. For an accessible and lucid summary of
the literature studying these phenomena in a range of decision-making settings,
see RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: pARADOXES AND ANOMAUF.S OF
ECONOMIC LIFE (1992). Some such anomalies have been documented in the
context of insurance purchases. See, e.g., Eric C. Johnson, John Hershey,
Jacqueline Meszaros, & Howard Kunreuther, Framins, Probability Distortions, and
Insurance Decisions, 7 J. RrsK & UNCERTAINTY 35 (1993) (summarizing anecdotal
evidence and experimental studies demonstrating how various well known
heuristics and biases affect insurance purchasing decisions).
26 BLACK AND SKIPPER, supra note 11 at 83. Personal consumption would include,
in the context, amounts expected to be donated to charity or any individual or
institution other than the dependent beneficiaries.
v What is the precise nature of the "stake" that the dependent-beneficiary has in
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beneficiary were risk averse, he or she would be willing to pay
a premium to shift the risk of the insured's premature death to
the insurance company.28
This analogy to property insurance is almost perfect in
situations involving the purchase of life insurance by one
business partner on the life of another or by a company on the
life of a "key employee."29 For example, the business partner
who seeks to shift the risk of the other partner's premature
death (and hence the loss of the valuable human capital that
has been built up in that person) will purchase herself (or
through the business on her behalf) the insurance policy on the
other partner's life. The other partner may well return the
favor.30 Perhaps a more common example of this type of life
insurance is "key employee" insurance.31 With this type of life
insurance, the employer seeks to protect itself against the loss
of revenue (or the general disruption in business) that would
result from the death of a particularly important employee,
such as a top sales person or executive or, if the employer is a
professional sports team, a star athlete.
However, in the vastly more frequent life-insurance
scenario, the policy is purchased on the life of the breadwinner
in a household (and much less often on the life of a primary
caregiver as well), and the beneficiaries of the policy are the
members of that household who are dependent on the
breadwinner's income (or caregiver's care).
There the
property-insurance analogy weakens and the analysis becomes
the human capital of the insured? That is one of the difficult questions to which
we will return below.
28 Because everyone dies eventually and because most people stop being income
generating assets around age 65 when they retire, the risk in question is whether
the insurei:l will die prematurely or, more precisely, before the point at which the
beneficiary is no longer dependent on the insured s income generating capacity.
29 See generall MARK 5. DORFMAN & SAUL w. ADELMAN, LIFE INSURANCE 438-64
y_
(2d ed.) (1992)
30 An interesting case involving life insurance purchased by business partners on
each other is Ryan v. Tickle, 316 N.W.2d 580 (1982). There, two morticians went
into the funeral home business together and took out life insurance policies on
each other. When one of the partners died, the other sought to recover the
proceeds of the policy. The legal issue was whether the widow of the deceased
partner had standing to contest the beneficiary-partner's insurable interest. The
court held that she cfid not. It has long been hefd that sole proprietors have an
insurable interest in the lives of their partners.
31 DORFMAN & ADELMAN, supra note 29 at 438-64. (" A key employee is defined as
any person whose death or disability would cause severe financial harm to the
organization, whether it is a sole proprietorship, a partnership or a
corporation.").
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more complex.32 For one thing, it is the breadwinner (not the
beneficiaries) who generally purchases and maintains the life
insurance policy on his or her own life. Further, in households
with two earners, it is usually the primary earner who actually
buys the life insurance, in the sense of being the contact person
with the insurance agent.33 Of course, the biggest divergence
from the property insurance analogy is that with life insurance,
if the loss event occurs, the breadwinner-insured is no longer in
the picture. The insured, therefore, is clearly not shifting any
risk that he or she personally faces. The story is more complex
than that.
Because of these misguided analogies to the property
insurance model, if we are to explain the breadwinner's (or
primary earner's) decision to purchase life insurance (to agree
to meet with the life insurance agent, have the physical exam,
the blood test, and arrange to pay the premiums for the policy),
we must adopt some theory of household economic decision
making. That is, we must answer the question: how does the
household decide to insure its breadwinner(s) or caregiver(s)?
If we take seriously the fact that the vast majority of policies are
purchased by primary earners on their own lives, two general
types of household consumption theories seem most
promising. First, one could adopt an exchange theory, under
which the insured agrees to purchase insurance on his or her
life in exchange for something of value from the dependents in
the household. Such a theory has some plausible explanatory
power insofar as the primary beneficiary of the policy is the
insured' s spouse. However, an exchange theory would seem
implausible, to the extent that the primary beneficiaries under
the policy are small children. In such situations, it is difficult to
imagine how the exchange would take place, because in most
cases, the children will never be aware of the existence of the
life insurance policy. In any event, by the time the children are
in a position to offer anything of value back to the insuring
parent, the policy often will have lapsed. In such cases, and to
Obviously there can be, and often is, more than one breadwinner within a
household. Each breadwinner can be viewed as a dependent of the other
breadwinner, in which case each might want insurance on the other's life, even
without children in the picture. It is also true that in households with children
whose primary caregiver is a stay-at-home parent (or other family member who
does not charge for the services), insurance mi$ht be demanded on the life of that
person even if that person is not also a breadwmner.
33 Telephone interview with Dan Kirk, insurance agent (April 2000).
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some extent for cases involving spouse-beneficiaries, an
altruism theory seems more appropriate. That is, the party
purchasing the insurance chooses to do so out of feelings of
affection for the dependent beneficiaries. Obviously, the best
explanation is probably some combination of altruism and
exchange.34
II. THE CURRENT LIFE INSURANCE MARKET

A.

The

Life Insurance Policy

To evaluate the question whether households are
purchasing adequate amounts of life insurance, we first need to
understand a few practical aspects of the life-insurance market,
as it currently exists.35 At the most basic level, a life insurance
policy is a type of contract.36
The simplest form of life
insurance contract is the term policy. Under a term policy, the
insurance company agrees to pay a predetermined amount of
money-called the "face amount'' or the "death benefit"-to the
beneficiary named in the policy if the insured dies during the
policy period, which is a period less than the insured's "whole
life."37 In return for this promise, the insured pays periodic
There is voluminous economic literature on the subject of intergenerational
transfers. That literature explores a number of alternative modelS for explaining
bequests (inter vivos gifts from parents to children or from IP'andparents to
grandchildren), including altruism theories, exchange theones, and
precautionary saving theories. For a useful and recent survey of this literature,
see Barbara H. Fried, Who Gets Utility from Bequests? The Distributive and Welfare
Implications for a Consumption Tax, 51 5TAN. L. REV. 641 (1999). As it turns out, no
single theory does a good job of explaining all of the bequest-related evidence.
Id. When children are the beneficiaries of life insurance policies, life insurance
easily can be understood as a means by which the insured can transfer wealth (in
this case, human capital) to the children. In such cases, the altruistic model
seems clearly more plausible than the exchange model, because by the time the
children are old enough to repay the parents for buying the insurance, the
insurance typically is allowed to lapse (if it is pure term insurance).
35 My discussion of the types of life insurance contracts draws heavily from
KENNFI'H BLACK JR. & HAROLD D. SKIPPER, JR., LIFE INSURANCE (12th ed. 1994).
36 For a discussion of the ways in which the informal aspects of the life insurance
"relationship" between insured and insurance agent and insurer can be as
important as the formal contractual aspects, see Tom Baker, Constructing the

34

Insurance Relationship: Sales Stories, Claims Stories, and Insurance Contract Damages,
72 TEX. L. REV. 1395 (1994).
37 BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 11, at 83. The" insured" is the person whose death
triggers the payment of the death benefit to the beneficiary. ROBERT H. JERRY II,
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW273 (2d ed. 1996). The "policy owner" is the

person with the power to designate the beneficiary under the policy and, with
cash value policies, the right to receive the cash surrender value. Id. This paper
uses the terms "insured" and "policy owner" synonymously, although iliey need
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premiums to the insurer which the insurer invests.
A
characteristic of term life insurance is that if the insured fails to
renew or cancels his policy, the coverage will cease and any
premiums that have been paid (and earned) will not be
refunded. Thus, term insurance is, in one sense, temporary.
The insured is covered only during the term of the policy
period. When an individual purchases term life insurance, the
contract typically provides for guaranteed renewal for a set
number of years. Policies often provide guaranteed renewals
up to age sixty-five or even seventy (but almost never beyond
seventy) .38 The longer the guaranteed renewal period, the
greater the protection for the policyholder against the
possibility that he or she might become uninsurable, for
example, as a result of a serious illness. That extra security,
however, comes at a cost of higher overall premiums. The
alternative, which is also available, is a term policy that allows
for renewal at various points but requires proof of insurability
at those points. Those policies are cheaper, but they leave the
insured with the risk of becoming uninsurable.
Standard renewable term insurance calls for premiums to
increase each year to reflect the increased likelihood of death
during the policy period as the members of the risk pool age.39
Also available, however, are fixed renewable term policies that
provide not only for a guaranteed renewal for a given period of
time, but also for a fixed annual premium over the life of the
policy. Given the increased risk of death associated with aging,
fixed renewable term policies necessarily involve some degree
of intra-insured cross-subsidization-that is, the insured pays
higher than actuarially fair premiums in the early years, but
lower than actuarially fair premiums in the later years.40 The
amount of the term premium is a function of the insured' s risk
factors (such as age, smoking status, medical history, and
cholesterol level) and the amount of coverage purchased. In a
competitive market, the premiums charged to a given insured
approximate the average mortality risk of the members of the
risk pool in which the insured is grouped. Most term policies
not always be the same person.
BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 11, at 84-85.
39 Id. at 89.
40 An intermediate type of policy that is often sold allows for level p remiums for
each policy period with premium increases at each renewal point (which might
occur at five or ten year intervals, for example). See id.
38
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involve increasing premiums over time and a level death
benefit. Some, however, involve a decreasing death benefit.
A somewhat more complex type of life insurance contract
is the "cash value" policy. On a superficial level, a cash value
policy looks like a term policy. The insured-investor pays a
"premium" to an insurance company that agrees, in the event
of the insured's death, to pay a specified amount called the
"death benefit" to the beneficiaries listed on the policy. But the
two types of life insurance are in fact quite different. In effect, a
cash value policy is two products bundled together: term life
insurance and an investment vehicle.41
Hence, when the
insured pays the premium to the insurer, that amount is both
insurance premium and side-fund investment.42
In other
BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 11, at 177.
42 The terminology used within the industry to describe various types of cash
value policies can be confusing, and it can also be important. "Cash value life
insurance" is a generic term tnat describes the category of life insurance contracts
that provide both for a term insurance element and a savings element. The term
that was traditionally used to describe this type of policy was " whole life
insurance," which derived from the fact that all such policies were in theory
designed to provide coverage for the " whole life" of the insured. Almost all
cash value policies provide for whole life coverage. "Term life insurance," as has
been mentioned, covers the insured only for the term of the policy period.
AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE INSURANCE FACT "BOOK 5 (1 998).
Today, because all cash value policies are designed to cover the insured-investor
for his or her entire life, the term "whole life insurance" has come to mean a
particular type of cash value policy-one that has fixed annual premiums, a fixed
Cleath benefit, and whose casn value is a function of, among other things, the
investment earnings of the insurer but whose cash value is not, technically, kept
in a separate account on behalf of the insured. BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 11, at
ch. 5. The other major classes of cash value policies are "universal life" and
"variable life" policies. Id. at 114, 126. What distinguishes universal life
insurance from traditional whole life is that universal allows variation in the
amount of premiums that are paid in each policy period and in the death benefit
options. In addition, universal policies tenCI to provide a clearer accounting of
tlieir internal cost-benefit structure, listing the mortality charge applied each year
and the amount of interest credited to the insured's cash value account each year.
Variable life policies are distinguished by the fact that the cash value of the
policies is placed in a separate account protected from the insurers' creditors. The
insurer, as the trustee of the insured, manages the account. The insured is
permitted within certain limits to direct how the cash value will be invested.
Variable life policies generally offer the insured an array of mutual fund options,
ranging from bond hinds to aggressive growth or equity index stock funds.
With variable life policies, the amount oI the cash value varies with the value of
the insured's cash value account, which variations can cause changes in the
amount of the death benefit depending on the terms of the policy. Variable life
policies, which are the fastest growing segment of the individual life market, can
have elements of universal policies-namely, flexible premium payments and
adjustable death benefit options. With the development of the variable life
policy, it is possible to replicate virtually any side fund investment approach
within a casn value policy. See generally id. at chs. 5 & 6.

41
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words, only part of the premium goes to purchase actual life
insurance coverage.
(That portion is sometimes called the
"mortality charge" or " actuarial charge." ) The rest goes into
some type of investment account that is held and managed on
behalf of the insured. It is that account which is sometimes
referred to as the policy's "inside buildup," because it grows as
the investment earnings accumulate over time. It is also called
the "cash surrender value," because it is the amount that can be
withdrawn by the policyholder when she cashes in (or
"surrenders") the policy. The death benefit on a cash value
policy always consists of a combination of pure term insurance
proceeds as well as return of investment.43

B.

The Regulation of Life Insurance

All insurance
companies
(including life insurance
companies) doing business in the United States are regulated at
the state level by state Departments of Insurance, headed by
elected or appointed Commissioners of Insurance.44 These
state insurance regulators, among other things, monitor insurer
solvency (both the assets and liabilities of the insurance
companies), insurance prices (for both "reasonableness" and
"adequacy"), policy terms, and agent conduct.45 Most of this
43 In the early years of a policy, the insurance element is relativelt large; in the
later years, assuming the cash value has increased (that is, none o the surrender
value has been removed from the policy), the insurance element becomes
increasingly small. See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 11, at 130. At some point,
assuming the insured-investor lives long enough, the cash value will equal the
death benefit and the proceeds will be paid out. This is called the "maturity
date." Id. at 131.
All life insurance can be categorized either as individual or group coverage.
LIFE INSURANCE FACT BOOK, supra note 5, at 1. Individual life insurance-whicn
includes cash value and term insurance-typically is sold to individuals by
agents. Id. at 3. This type of policy is sometimes called ordinary life insurance,
afthough technically the latter term is a slightly narrower category. Id. Group
insurance is a contract that provides life insurance to a group of individuals. A
common example is employer-provided group insurance to all employees of the
firm. Id. at 16. Both casfi value and term policies can be purchased as group
coverage, although group term policies are much more common than group cash
value policies. Id. at 16-18. Indeed, by some measures, group term life insurance
is the most prevalent type of term life insurance coverage in the U.S. today. Id.
44 JERRY, supra note 37, at 98. State insurance regulators, on the basis of their
authority under the U.S. Constitution and under the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
generally require any insurance company engaged in the business of selling
insurance contracts m their state to be licensed in that state. PETER M. LENCSIS,
INSURANCE REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN OVERVIEW FOR BUSINESS AND
GOVERNMENT 25-26 (1997).
45 JERRY, supra note 37, at 84-95.
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regulation can be justified on standard consumer protection
grounds.46 For example, the regulation of insurer solvency and
of pricing adequacy is deemed necessary to guarantee the
credibility of insurer promises, implicit in every insurance
contract, that the insurer will have sufficient assets to cover the
policyholder's claim if and when it is filed. The necessity of
such regulation depends on the assumption that consumers, on
their own, cannot judge adequately the credibility of insurers'
promises to "be there" when the time comes-that is, they
cannot judge whether the insurer will have sufficient assets to
cover all of its liabilities. Other similar consumer protection
stories are needed to explain statutorily mandated policy
terms, such as incontestability clauses47 and nonforfeiture
provisions.48 Although many insurers would provide such
provisions in the absence of legal requirements, the fact that the
mandates have been adopted presumes a need for consumer
protection.
In addition, various legal doctrines have
developed, such as the doctrine of reasonable expectations, that
also have a consumer protection underpinning.
These
doctrines protect insurance purchasers from their inability or
unwillingness to read the fine print in their insurance policies
and to investigate the companies thoroughly.49
46 For a general discussion of the economic rationales for various forms of
insurance regulation, see SETH J. CHANDLER, INSURANCE REGULATION,
ENCYCWPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (1999).
47 An incontestability clause provides that after a policy has been in force for two

years, the policy's validity will become "incontestable," which means that the
bases on which an insurer can contest coverage or decline to pay a claim are
severely limited. JERRY, supra note 37, at 703. Such clauses have long been
included in life insurance contracts, as a response to the fear that insurers, after
taking the policyholder's money for all those years, would turn around and
refuse to pay a death claim because of some technical flaw in the application
process. Id. (datin� incontestability clauses to late nineteenth century). The idea
behind the clauses IS that insurers nave two years to make sure that the policy is
valid-to verify the representations made in the application, for example-and
after that, the policyholder (that is, the householcf that will be depencfing on the
insurance proceeds) can count on the insurance proceeds being paid if the
insured dies. Many states have enacted statues requiring such provisions. Id.
48 In the past, life insurance policies had no cash values, thus, when policies were
canceled or allowed to lapse, the policyholder "forfeited" any "excess"
contributions. BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 11, at 202. Standard nonforfeiture
laws govern how insurers must proceed in calculating and reporting their
"nonforfeiture values" -that is, the minimum amount that a cash value
policyholder will receive upon termination of the policy. Id.
49 According to one leading treatise on insurance law, the doctrine of reasonable
expectations, derived from numerous court decisions, can be summarized as
follows:
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A somewhat different concern motivates the requirement
in every state that a party purchasing a life insurance policy
have an "insurable interest" in the life of the insured. The
insurable interest doctrine, which applies to all forms of
insurance in every state, historically has been understood to
serve two functions: a) to discourage the use of insurance
contracts as a form of gambling, and b) to reduce the incentive
of policyholders to cause the event that is insured against.50
The idea is that if the policyholder stands to lose something
(his or her insurable interest) if the loss event occurs, then the
purchase of an insurance policy is not really like gambling and,
of course, the moral hazard concern is lessened. With property
insurance, the question is whether the insured has some
economic interest-be it a "legal interest'' or a "factual
expectancy interest"-in the property being insured. With life
insurance, the analysis is more subtle.
First, a person is
presumed to have an insurable interest in his or her own life.
Second, if a party wants to take out an insurance policy on
another person's life, that party must demonstrate either a
substantial pecuniary interest in the life of the insured or a
close familial tie (which is presumed to be a proxy for a
financial interest) .51This article focuses on intra-household life
insurance, because it is with respect to that type of life
insurance that the theory and evidence, discussed below,
suggest a problem of inadequate coverage.

In general, courts will protect the reasonable expectations of applicants,
insureds, and intended beneficiaries regarding the coverage afforded by
insurance contracts even though a careful examination of the policy
provisions indicates that such expectations are contrary to the expressed
intention of the insurer.
ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDIS.S, INSURANCE LAW (Student's ed. 1988). The
justifications for this doctrine clearly invoke consumer protection concerns, such
as the fact that insurance contracts are long and impossibly complicated and that
insurer marketing practices can be misleading. Id. at 634-36.
so Id. at 173.
s1 Id. at 179. (statin� that " [t]he common or unifying characteristic of these two
types of relationships is that in both there is a reason for the beneficiary of the life
insurance to anticipate that some economic benefits either will or may result
from the continuation of the [insured's] life ...." ). In general, an individual has an
insurable interest in all of the members of his or her nuclear family, including a
spouse or minor child. A minor child has an insurable interest in the life of a
parent. Id. at 181.
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Ill. DEFENDING THE CLAIM OF LIFE-INSURANCE INADEQUACY

A.

Empirical Research o n Life-Insurance Adequacy

By far the most sophisticated study of life-insurance
adequacy ever completed is the most recent one, authored by
B. Douglas Bernheim, Lorenzo Forni, Jagadeesh Gokhale, and
Laurence J. Kotlikoff, the results of which have been made
available in a working paper entitled The Adequacy of Life
Insurance: Evidence from the Health and Retirement Survey.52 That
article builds on a model of life-insurance adequacy developed
by Alan Auerbach and Laurence Kotlikoff in a series of papers
in the late 1980s and early 1990s.53 According to this approach,
"life insurance is defined to be adequate if the survivor's
highest sustainable standard of living after the death of a
spouse is equal to or greater than the couple's highest
sustainable standard of living if both survive."54
If the
household's standard of living would decrease when a spouse
dies, that household would be considered underinsured.
Although this basic approach is the same as the earlier
studies', there are two important differences: First, the
Bernheim study examines much more recent data.55 Second,
the Bernheim study adjusts for a number of important factors
that prior studies did not, including liquidity constraints and
_ changes in household composition over time (such as the
presence of children).
The authors make a number of
assumptions to make the enterprise tractable. First, they define
the "household" to include husbands and wives until their
deaths and children until they reach age eighteen.56 Second,
the authors make assumptions about the household utility
function that allows them to predict how the death of a
Bernheim et al., supra note 2.
Auerbach & Kotlikoff, Life Insurance of the Elderly, supra note 2; and Auerbach &
Kotlikoff, Adequacy of Life fnsurance, supra note 2.
54 BERNHEIM et al., supra note 2, at 6"[W]e consider the level of life insurance to be
adequate if it allows an individual and his or her children to sustain his or her
living standard upon the death of a spouse." Id at 2. By adopting a standard-of
living baseline, ilie authors simply have relied on their own mtuitions as to the
choice of a useful benchmark and have not attempted to rely on some derivation
of the VNM utility function.
55 Whereas the prior studies were based on data from the 1960s and 1970s, this
��y looks as data from the 1992 wave of the Health and Retirement Survey
(HK:;). Id. at 2.
56 Id. at 7.
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breadwinner will affect household consumption patterns.57
Along the same lines, they treat certain types of expenditures
such as housing costs, college tuition and wedding expenses
for children, and funeral costs-as being fixed, by which they
mean that those expenses would not be reduced or eliminated
in the event of the death of an adult in the household.58 Finally,
the software package the authors use employs a sophisticated
approach to measuring Social Security benefits (including
survivorship benefits), income and payroll taxes, and tax
deferred retirement savings.59
For a more detailed discussion of the study's methodology,
data, and findings, the reader is encouraged to refer to the
paper itself.60 This article only summarizes some of the more
noteworthy results.
The most general conclusion is that
underinsurance is indeed widespread-for husbands and wives,
for primary earners and secondary earners, for the relatively
young and the relatively old, and for high income and low
income households.61 However, the prevalence and severity of
underinsurance does exhibit some patterns: the problem is
much more concentrated in some areas than in others. For
example, a higher percentage of households are underinsured
on the husband's life rather than on the wife's life.62 The
discrepancy in adequacy is even greater as between the lives of
primary eamers63 and those of secondary eamers.64 Also, in
at 8.
at 9.
59 Id. at 10-11. The study also leaves out a few things. For example, it does not
attempt to take account of the possibility that a survivin� spouse will remarry. It
justifies this assumption on the theory that "the econonnc well-being of a
remarried individual may be deternnned by his or her financial status prior to
remarriage, insofar as this affects bargaining power within the new marriage."
Id. at 12 (citing Shelly Lundberg, Family Bargaining and Retirement Behavior, m
(Herny Aaron ed.), BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND RETIREMENT POLICY (forthcoming
1999) .
60 This paper can be found at http:/ /www.nber.org/papers/w7372.
6t See BERNHEIM et al., supra note 2, at 24.Three categories of underinsurance were
defined: If the death of a spouse would reduce a household's standard of living
at all, the household was said to be merely "underinsured" with respect to that
�ouse. If the reduction would be between 20% and 40%, the household was
' silmificantly underinsured." And if the reduction would be greater than 40%,
thenousehold was "severely underinsured."
62 In terms of mere underinsurance, fifty-one percent of households were
underinsured on the husband's life, and twenty-four percent on the wife's life.
With res�t to severe or significant underinsurance, the numbers are thirty
percent (for husbands) and twelve percent (for wives). Id.
63 Fifty-five percent of households underinsured; thirty-four percent significantly
or severely so. Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
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households with single earners, the underinsurance problem
on the life of the sole earner is quite pronounced.65 One clear
message comes from all of these numbers: underinsurance, as
defined in this study, is alarmingly high with respect to the
lives of primary earners.66 The authors also find that the
prevalence and degree of underinsurance are greatest in
relatively young households.67
Perhaps this should be
expected, given that younger households have more human
capital (that is, future earnings) to protect. Also, it is not
surprising that underinsurance is most pronounced in
households with children.68 Taking all of these results into
account, the authors conclude that their " results point to
widespread underinsurance."69
Similar conclusions were reached in prior studies. In the
late 1980s and early 1990s, Auerbach and Kotlikoff concluded
that a significant minority of households that were nearing or
in retirement in the late 1960s had inadequate life insurance
coverage. Those studies found further that almost one-half of
households "at risk" (those for whom a substantial fraction of
household assets will disappear with the death of the husband
or wife) had inadequate life insurance. The authors therefore
64 Twenty-one percent of households underinsured; eight percent severely so.
The reason for the greater discrepancy with respect to primary and secondary
earners is, of course, that some wives are primary earners within their
households. Id.
65 In such households, roughly twenty-one percent are severely underinsured, and
another fourteen percent are significantly underinsured, on the life of the
primary earner. Id. at 26.
66 When the households are arranged according to income, other interesting
patterns emerge. For example, underinsurance tends to fall as income rises at the
lower levels of income; then it levels off (that is, underinsurance tends to remain
constant as income rises) at moderate levels of income. Id. at 25. However, when
it comes to significant and severe underinsurance, the tendency is the reverse.
Both significant and severe underinsurance tend to decrease with income at low
levels of income and to rise with income at high levels of income. Id. What
explains this result? The authors suggest that significant and severe
underinsurance on the lives of prima.r;y earners in the highest-earning
households is to be expected because 'these households are more likely to have a
single high earner, and because Social Security survivor benefits replace a much
smaller f'iaction of income." Id.
67 For example, in households with husbands and wives who are in their forties,
seventy-one percent of households are underinsured, and forty-nine percent are
significantly or severely underinsured, on primary earners. Id. at 27.
68 In households without children present, for example, there was considerably
less underinsurance (fifty-two percent) and significant and severe
underinsurance (thirty-one percent) than in households with children present
(sixty-nine percent and forty-seven percent, respectively). Id. at 28.
69 See generally BERNHEIM, supra note 2.
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predicted that roughly one-third of the older wives in their
sample would have experienced twenty-five percent or greater
reduction in their living standards had their husbands died
during the survey year.70 They predicted greater insurance
shortfalls for younger widows.71 They reached similar results
in another study, this time of data compiled from surveys of a
cross-section of U.S. households consisting of married couples
with husbands between the ages of thirty-five and fifty-five. In
that study they also found that a significant minority of
households were underinsured with respect to the lives of the
husbands.72
The underinsurance problem
was
most
pronounced in the households in which women were
considered " at risk" in the following sense: over half of the
household's total life-contingent assets were attributable to the
husband's life.73
All of those findings, the authors conclude, probably
understate the extent of the underinsurance problem for
several reasons. First, the authors' calculations assumed no
economies of scale in shared living arrangements.74 If such
economies exist, if "two can live cheaper than one," then a
larger amount of insurance would be needed to maintain a
given standard of living. For simplicity, they assumed no such
economies. Second, the SRI surveys included little data on
private pension benefits.75 Because most private pensions at
the time were defined-benefit rather than defined-contribution
plans, and because such plans at the time typically did not offer
joint-survivorship benefits, this omission probably caused the
underinsurance problem to be understated. Third, Auerbach
and Kotlikoff made no effort to take account of the
consumption
requirements
of
small
children
in
the
Adding children to the mix almost certainly
household.76
10 Auerbach and Kotlikoff, Sample of Older Widaws, supra note 2, at 6.
n Id. at 7.
72 Roughly twenty-five to thirty percent of the households in the survey would
have sitffered a reduction in standard of living of at least thirty percent, and
fifteen percent would have suffered at least a reduction of fifty percent had the
husbands died. Auerbach & Kotlikoff, Adequacy of Life Insurance Purchases, supra
note 2, at 233.
73 In those households, twenty percent of wives would lose fifty percent or more
of their standard of living, and forty-one percent would lose tliirly percent or
more, if the husband were to die in the survey year. Id. at 234.
74 Id. at 240.
75 Id.
76 Id.
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would increase the amount of coverage on a breadwinner's life
necessary to prevent a drop in consumption power in the event
of his or her death. Fourth, when calculating the value of each
spouse's human capital, Auerbach and Kotlikoff assumed zero
growth in the real rate of earnings.77 Of course, it is possible
that real earnings could stay the same over time, or even
decrease, but it is most likely that real earnings would increase
with age, especially between the ages of thirty-five and fifty
five.
Thus, an assumption of zero growth would tend to
understate the underinsurance problem.78
In sum, all of the academic studies of life-insurance
adequacy have concluded that life-insurance "inadequacy" is
pervasive and in some cases severe. Additional (albeit weak)
support for the claim of underinsurance comes from insurance
industry lore and survey research. First, there is an industry
rule of thumb that a "typical" household (one that includes two
adults and two children) should have life-insurance coverage
that equals between five and seven times its annual income.
For whatever that rule of thumb is worth,79 industry research
indicates that many households do not come close to meeting
that coverage.
For example, according to one study, the
average level of coverage was roughly 2.85 times the average
annual household income for the sample .so

77 Id. at 228.
78 Because the Bernheim study addresses all of these shortcomings-it accounts
for economies of scale, it incorporates a great deal of pension information, it
includes the presence of children, and it accounts for earnings growth-it is not
surprising that their study finds underinsurance to be more prevalent and more
severe than the Auerbach. and Kotlikoff studies did. Compare BERNHEIM, et al.,
supra note 2 with Auerbach & Kotlikoff, Adequacy ofLife Insurance Purchases, supra
note 2. Another interesting finding in that particular Auerbach and Kotlikoff
paper was that households rarely updated their coverage. Auerbach & Kotlikoff,
supra note 2 at 3. That discovery is especially noteworthy because the survey
was conducted during and afte eriods of rapid inflation, when theory would
sug est that insurance coverage which is ahriost never indexed for inflation)
woJ1d need to be increased re arly. This failure to adjust one's coverage over
time could be responsible for at least some of the underinsurance problem.
'l9 Some life insurance experts contend that any life-insurance "rule of thumb" is
basically worthless. JOSEPH BELTH LIFE INSURANCE: A CONSUMER'S HANDBOOK (2d
ed. 1985). The claim is that an accurate determination of life insurance need is
too contingent on various factors that differ significantly from one individual to
the next for any rule of thumb to be of use. Cf BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 11, at
326-73 (showing the detailed calculations necessary to determine life insurance
adequacy).
80 AMERICAN COUNOL OF LIFE INSURANCE, supra note 5, at 12.
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Reasons to Be Worried

One might be tempted to conclude that the findings of
insurance inadequacy summarized above are, by themselves
and with no further justification, sufficient to warrant a call for
That would be a mistake.
swift government intervention.
Although the studies provide grounds for concern, there
remains a considerable degree of uncertainty about how to
interpret those results. Recall, for example, that the Bernheim
study chose as its baseline of insurance adequacy the standard
of living prior to the breadwinner's death.81 That is certainly a
defensible benchmark, even an admirable one, but it clearly is
not the only plausible one. Moreover, although the Bernheim
study concludes that underinsurance is widespread, the
authors nevertheless take great pains to emphasize the non
normative nature of their study.82 They make clear that their
definitions of "inadequacy" and "underinsurance" are not
meant to carry any normative implication.83 For example, in
the introduction the authors say:

It is important to emphasize that we do not equate adequacy
with rationality. A couple might purchase relatively little life
insurance for a variety of economically legitimate reasons. For
example, the household's decision maker(s) may place
relatively little weight on the well being of the secondary
earner, or may regard life insurance as excessively expensive.
Thus, the current study is not intended to shed light on the
rationality of life insurance purchases.84
At the beginning of their "Methodology" section, they state
that

The adequacy of a household's life insurance is in the eyes of
the beholder. Virtually any level of life insurance can be
rationalized as reflecting the maximization of some
intertemporal and
state-specific preference function.
Nevertheless, we think it possible to establish meaningful
benchmarks and to evaluate the adequacy of insurance in
comparison to these benchmarks. In so doing, it is important
to emphasize that significant deviations from the benchmarks
do not necessarily reflect irrationality. Rather, they simply
indicate the extent to which actual choices either fall short of or
exceed some easily interpreted target.BS
BERNHEIM, et al., supra note 2, at 6.
Id. at 3.
83 Id. at 2-3.
84 Id. at 2-3.
85 Id. at 5-6.
81

82
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Finally, consistent with their non-normative approach, in
the conclusion of the paper, although the authors report
widespread
underinsurance,"
they
make
no
policy
recommendations.86
Why does the Bernheim study go to such lengths to
emphasize the non-normative nature of their enterprise
(despite the use of the term " adequacy" throughout their
paper)? The reason is simple: identifying definitively a single
11
optimal" or " adequate" amount of life insurance for a given
household is impossible. What seems odd, however, is the
implicit assumption that such indeterminacy precludes any
normative judgment whatsoever. Since when? For example, a
clever scholar could come up with a model to explain virtually
any pattern of consumption over time, even one that entailed
almost no retirement savings. And yet countless scholars and
policymakers operate under the assumption that some level of
government intervention, either a tax subsidy for retirement
savings or some form of compulsory retirement savings, is
appropriate.87
The reason, of course, is that we easily can envision all
sorts of pathologies-ranging from standard externality stories
to myopia stories-that would lead individuals to undersave for
retirement. A similar set of stories as well as a few additional
ones can be offered at least as persuasively in support of
government intervention in the life insurance market.
11

1.

Adverse Selection

For starters, consider one of the most commonly offered
justifications for social insurance regimes: the problem of
adverse selection.
In the life-insurance context, adverse
selection occurs when some individuals are more informed
about their own statistical life expectancy than insurers are. In
such a situation, premiums tend to be inefficiently high, as
insurers will be compensating for the fact that the relatively
high-risk individuals will tend to "adversely select'' into the
86 Id. at 35. The absence of a normative element and a policy recommendation is
something of a departure from the earlier Auerbach and Kotlikoff studies, which
concluded with recommendations of increased survivorship benefits.
87 See, e. g ., HARVEY s. ROSEN, PuBUC FINANCE 197 (4th ed. 1995) (" [I]t is popularly
believed that in the absence of the Social Security program, most people would
not accumulate enough assets to finance an adequate 1evel of consumption
during their retirement.").
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insurance pool. As a result, all other individuals will tend to
purchase less than optimal life insurance coverage or perhaps
even forego coverage altogether. BB
2.

Negative Externalities

Next, consider how standard externality arguments might
be applied to life insurance. The breadwinners in a household
may anticipate that if they die leaving survivors who are
destitute, the extended family and friends of the survivors as
well as local charitable organizations, will step in to fill the
breach. If so, an externality were created, which means a lower
amount of life insurance will be purchased than would be the
case if such informal sources of support were not available.
This conclusion assumes of course that the extended family
members, friends, and charitable organizations realistically
never have an opportunity ex ante to contribute to the purchase
of insurance on the life of the breadwinner in question, an
assumption
that seems quite
plausible. 89
Likewise,
See generally id. at 196-97 (summarizing the adverse selection justification of
social insurance). For the seminal, albeit technical, article on adverse selection,
see Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, E q uilibrium in Competitive Insurance
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q. J. ECON. 629
(1976). Of course, insurance companies attempt to counteract adverse selection
in several ways. For example, the development of employer-provided group life
insurance may, in part, be attributable to the way that group underwriting (in
contrast with individual underwriting) responds to the adverse-selection effect.
Moreover, insurers have developed ways of combating the most egregious
forms of adverse selection, even for life insurance p olicies sold to individuals.
For example, in addition to the usual battery of medical-history questions that
are asked of every insurance applicant, advances in medical technology such as
new blood and urine tests help life insurers to segregate the high, medium, and
low risk individuals into separate pools. Neither of these approaches, however,
completely eliminates the problem. With group life insurance, there is still a
greater tendency for high-risk individuals thari for low-risk individuals to buy
the group term coverage at any given price. Additionally, the blood tests and
application process for individual policies are not perfect.
89 Indeed, it is difficult to imagine grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, and
friends approaching an individual and suggesting that if he would increase his
life insurance coverage they would all bear the extra cost to spare themselves the
cost, ex post, of contributing to the support of the survivors. Of course, one
could also argue that relying on friends and family in this way is a desired form
of insurance rather than a type of extemality. Indeed, in one sense, reliance on
family and friends is the original form of lffe insurance, and it may continue to be
a type of life insurance that we want to encourage. That is, one might argue that
society benefits-perhaps from an increased sense of community-when extended
family and friends are expected to bear some of the load of a breadwinner's
death. That reasoning, if persuasive, would tend to cut against the finding of
underinsurance. However, if we take that argument seriously here, we would
need to do so elsewhere as well. For example, on similar reasoning, we might
88
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government-provided survivorship benefits tell a similar sort
of externality story.90
That is, one could argue that
underinsured households externalize costs to all taxpayers
because of the payroll-tax-funded Social Security survivorship
benefits.91
3.

Myopia or Lack of Self Control

What about the myopia argument?
In the context of
retirement savings, it is often argued that some type of
compulsory savings or transfer system (such as the Social
Security system), or at least some type of government subsidy
for retirement savings (such as IRAs and 401(k) plans), is
justified on the theory that young individuals do not plan
adequately for the future.92 A number of possible reasons to
suspect such myopic savings behavior exist: (a) people may
lack the information necessary to judge their needs in
retirement; (b) people may be unable to make effective
decisions about long-term issues because they are unwilling to
confront the aging process; and (c) they simply may apply an
inappropriately high discount rate to the future.93
These
arguments would seem to apply with at least as much strength
in the context of life insurance purchases: (a) households (or
breadwinners as agents of households) really do not know
what the households' financial needs will be in the event of a
want to discourage retirement savings so as to encourage reliance by aging
parents on their cltildren' s resources.
90 Cf Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics ofMandated Benefits, 79 AM.
ECON. REV., May 1989, at 177, 178 (describing similar extemality in context of
health insurance); John laitner, Bequests, Gifts, and Social Security, 55 REV. ECON.
STUD. 275 (1988) (describing similar externality, or rational free-riding myopia, in
context of retirement savings).
91 "Families [who purchase inadequate life insurance) may choose to rely on
existin& government welfare programs if premature death of the family provider
occurs. Treasury Report, infra note 176, at 40; see also Summers, supra note 90, at

178.

See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 87, at 197; CASEY B. MULLIGAN & XAVIER SALA-I
MARTIN, Social Security in Theo ry and Practice (II): Efficiency Theories, Narrative
Theories, and Implications for Rejorm at 18 (Nat'l Bureau Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 7119, May 1999) (describing "myopic prodigality" justifications of
social security).
93 Peter Diamond, A Framework for Social Security Analysis, 8 }. Pus. ECON. 275
(1977). For the views of one prominent economist who is sympathetic to
proposition (a), see Martin Fe1dstein, The Optimal Level of Social Security Benefits,
100 Q. J. ECON 303 (1985). Of course, the argument can also run in the other
direction-that is, that the existence of Socia[Security discourages retirement
savings. See generally ROSEN, supra note 87, at 205-09.
92
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breadwinner's death;94 (b) individuals almost certainly are
more averse to thinking about dying than about living long
enough to retire;95 and (c) individuals may apply an irrationally
high discount rate when considering the future state of the
world in which the breadwinner might be dead.
This last concern - of overweighing present needs over
It is commonly
future ones - deserves special emphasis.
argued, for example, that smokers place an irrationally high
value on the current pleasure of smoking as compared to the
value they place on the harmful health effects that smoking will
bring ten, twenty, or thirty years in the future.96 Indeed,
psychological literature on this issue suggests that, where a
substantial time gap exists between costs and benefits,
individuals tend to use different discount rates-a higher rate
for the distant cost or benefit and a lower rate for the more
proximate one.97 The result is that, in the short run, the
individual prefers the option that minimizes short-run costs or
Part of the problem lies with the difficulty of determining the full value of the
household human capital. Not only should it include the value of the insured' s
earning capacity but it should also include the value of his or her nonmonetary
services to the household. Both of these values are likely to be underestimated.
Indeed, all of the various empirical studies of life-insurance adequacy have
ignored the present value of household services. Also, even for the portion of
numan capital attributable to future earnings, substantial underestimation is
likely. For example, how likely is it that individuals will think to take into
account future real pay increases when assessing life-insurance needs? Plus it
seems almost certain that the purchasers of life insurance will underestimate the
cost that the household will incur to hire someone to do all of the things that the
insured used to do around the house. For example, will they know, when
calculating the discounted present value of the insured' s future services to the
household, to take into account that buying replacement services-childcare or
household chores-will come out of after-tax dollars whereas the services
themselves came out of pre-tax dollars?
95 One of the principal difficulties that trust and estate lawyers face in dealing
with their clients is getting them to contemplate and plan for various "end of
life" issues. Scholars who spend most of ilieir time studying life insurance
recognize as a serious concern people's persistent unwillingness to plan for
death. See BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 11, at 338. In many instances, individuals
act as if they consider themselves immortal; they are psychologically unwillin�
or unable to face their own mortality." BLACK & SKIPPER, supra note 11, at 338. It
is a matter of common knowledge to persons in the state planning field that a
man will devote a lifetime of energy to obtain a business or an estate and spend
no time at all or little time in arranging to pass along his estate at death." Theo P.
Otjen & Arthur J. Pabst, Updating Life Insurance Settfement Options: A Comparison
with Wills, 27 J. INS. 75 (1960).
96 Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex
Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L J. 1163, 1203-05 (1998).
"' George Loewenstein & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal Clwice, 3 J.
ECON. PERSP. 181, 183-84 (1989); see also Robert H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency
in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REV. ECON. STUD. 165 (1956).
94
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maximizes short-run benefits (for example, forgoing the
purchase of life insurance), but that, as the time draws closer
for the benefit to be received (here, the insurance proceeds
become more likely as the insured gets older), the individual's
preferences switch.
This sort of dynamic inconsistency of
preferences-or " myopia" -is considered to be quite common,98
and one could easily see how such a phenomenon might affect
life insurance decisions.99

4.

Why the Market Alone Cannot Fix These Problems

Even if there are problems of myopia initially, one might
expect the market (namely, insurance companies) to come to
the rescue.
That is, if consumers have a tendency to
underestimate their life insurance needs, insurance companies
would have an incentive to educate them; and that education,
of course, is precisely what insurance companies try to do. The
main job of the insurance agent is to convince the customers
that they need income replacement (or human capital)
insurance.100 For that reason, virtually every licensed lifeGeorge Ainslie, Specious Reward: A Behavioral Theory of Impulsiveness and Impulse
Control, 82 PSYCHOL. BULL. 463 (1975). The whole problem of myopia, Put here

98

in terms of differing discount rates, can also be expressed in terms of ', multiple
selves" models. That is, the problem can be understood as the current self (the
one deciding how much present consumption to forego to fund post-retirement
consumption) not adequately taking into account the interest of the future self
(the one who will need to live on those savings). See, ]ON EI.STER, ULYSSES AND
THE SIRENS {1979); Thomas C. Schelling, SelfCommand in Practice, in Policy, and in

a Theory ofRational Choice, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1984).

Purchasing life insurance requires a household to forego current income in
order to finance a future contingent benefit. If decision-making in this context is
similar to decision-making in other contexts, it seems plausible that the
household will apply a higher discount rate to the future death benefit than it
will to the current insurance premium. In addition, life insurance transactions
for individual policies require the applicant to go through the "hassle" of the
underwriting process, wfuch often includes giving a blood sample and a urine
sample and sometimes going through a more thorough medical examination. It
is unclear how much of a deterrent the life-insurance underwriting process is;
however, given all of the other factors weighing against the purchase of life
insurance, the process might be enough to keep many individuals from buying
anything more than the group term insurance that is offered through their
employers, which typically requires only that the employee sign up within a
given period after fiist joining the company.
100 Traditionally, this has been the primary role of the insurance agent. The
marketing strategy of life-insurance agents in recent years, however, has shifted
from selling human-capital insurance to selling investment products that have
some or nolife-insurance component-products such as cash value insurance and
variable annuities. VIVIANA ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE DEVEWPMENT
OF LIFE INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 111-12 (1979) (explaining early shift in
marketing life insurance toward emphasis on investment futures); see also GLEN

99
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insurance agent has access to computer software that enables
the agent to produce impressive and convincing "illustrations"
of the customer's life-insurance needs. Such services have long
been available for those individuals willing to sit down with an
A more recent phenomenon is the
insurance agent.
proliferation of insurance-needs calculators at various web sites
If a
sponsored by insurance companies and others.101
consumer were to take the time to visit one of those sites and
enter all the relevant data (such as annual income, net worth,
number of children, and the like), she could get an estimate of
her life insurance needs. Many of those needs calculators will
force consumers to think through just the sorts of questions
posed in the earlier discussion of insurance adequacy; for
example, one common question is whether the individual
seeking to purchase insurance on his life wants enough
coverage to pay off the mortgage on the family house, to start a
college fund, or to create an emergency fund.
But even these needs calculators and agents willing to
assess a person's life insurance needs are not enough by
themselves; both require time and effort. If consumers are not
inclined to give much thought to life insurance in the first
place, it seems unlikely that many will go to the trouble to find
a reliable insurance-needs calculator. What is more, consumers
may be inclined to distrust any needs assessments made by
life-insurance agents on the theory that those agents stand to
gain (in sales commissions) by overestimating the household's
life-insurance need.
This last observation suggests a more pervasive problem:
the public's distrust of life insurance agents. Although there
was a time when the job of being a life insurance agent was
understood (certainly within the field and to a lesser extent by
consumers) as a noble and worthy calling, almost akin to the
ministry,1°2 that view has since been superceded by a radically
REYNOLDS, THE MORTALITY MERCHANTS 4 (1968) (stating that II [t]he life insurance
industry in the United States, for its own reasons, has from its early origins de
emphasized the actual purpose for its existence by discouraging the sale of pure
death protection."); Id. at 177 (stating that "Pure death p rotection, or term
insurance, is the outcast of the life insurance industry.").
1 01 For example, consider the following insurance-need calculator articles:
http:// www.life-line.org/ life/index.fi.tml; http://www.tiaa
cre1.org/lins/ howmuch:html;
http:/ /www.worldwidewebinc.net/ family/ cacu lator.html.
102 See, e.g., ZELIZER, supra note 100, at 119-29 (describing life insurance agents as
being "indispensable" and akin to "salaried missionaries").
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different conception. Insurance agents have come to be viewed
(at least by many consumers) as being more in a class with
used car salesmen than with charity workers.103 This more
cynical view of insurance agents has been attributed to the
transformation of life insurance products from pure insurance
against premature death (that is, term insurance) to a type of
sophisticated-and for many, quite mysterious-investment. In
fact, some critics of the insurance industry and its marketing
tactics have laid much of the blame for the negative views of
life insurance and of life insurance agents on the development
of the cash value policy.104
Cash value policies are
characterized by agents as the only form of "permanent" life
insurance-with term insurance being given the pejorative
"temporary" or " rented" insurance.1os The cash value policies
are marketed so that the administrative costs, which are
believed to be prohibitively high, are often hidden from
consumers. Moreover, the rate of return on investments in
cash value policies historically has been pitifully low (or at least
that is the perception) and consumers have been less than fully
informed (and in some cases, misled) about the nature of the
products they are purchasing or the risks they are taking.106
1o3

Id. at 129-47 (recounting enduring stigma that historically has attached to life
insurance agents and characterizing fife-insurance sales as part of society's
necessary "dirty work"). According to one insurance-industry observer,
consumer advocate, and former state commissioner of insurance, many financial
reporters regard the life insurance business as "legalized thievery." James H.
Hunt, Life Cost Disclosure Prospects for True Reform, 13 J. INS. REG. 405, 422 (1995).
104 See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 100, at 5-16. According to some experts, "[b]y
the mid-1980s the focus on many sales presentations oflife insurance seemed to
be on life insurance as an investment," rather than on life-insurance as protection
against the loss of human capital due to premature death. Tom Foley & Carolyn
Jollnson, Introduction to Symposium, 13 J. INS. REG. 398, 399 (1995). "'In sales
presentations death benefits are often almost an afterthought."' Id. (quoting an
insurer).
.
105 REYNOLDS, suvra note 100, at 2 (explaining the difference between "permanent"
and "temporary'' or "rented" insurance).
10& "The business is riddled with self-dealing, unsound investments, unsuitable
policies, high-pressure selling and unbridled sales expenses. Consumers take
Iar�e losses when they drcp expensive coverage they shouldn't have bought and
can t afford." Jane Bryant Quinn, et al., Here TlieY. Go Again, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 7,
1994, at 28 (citing a New York investigation of the life insurance business); see
also Foley & Johnson, supra note 104, at 399-400.
The quality of information being utilized in the marketing of life
insurance has deteriorated. Some of the deterioration results from an
increased use of gimmickry in policy illustrations and advertising. For
example, interest rates are featured prominently, but charges made to
the policy owner are not . . . The quoted interest rates may relate neither
to performance nor to any other valid basis, but may simply be picked
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Furthermore, it seems to be no coincidence that agents who sell
individual life insurance policies (as distinct from group
policies) make most of their commissions from the sale of cash
value policies.107 Notably, the commissions on cash value
policies are easier to hide, partly due to the abundance of
Compensation for
numbers contained in the policy.
" explaining" this complicated type of policy is easy to justify.
5.

The Dynamics of Household Consumption Decisions

A final reason why life insurance may be suboptimally
consumed involves the way that economic decisions are made
within households. Traditionally, it has been assumed that
there is joint and equal control over and consumption of
This
household resources between spouses in a marriage.
assumption derives from the prevailing economic model of the
household pioneered by Gary Becker.
On this model, the
household is assumed to have a single, unitary utility function;
household resources are distributed by an altruistic head.108

More recently, however, scholars have begun to question this
out of the air(quoting Charles Rohm, In Vv1zose Interest, 87 VEST'S REV.

(1986)).

14

It is the continuing problem of life-insurance agents' use of misleading sales
presentations that motivated the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners to adopt the Life Insurance Illustration Model Regulation in
1995, which was intended to clarify and standardize the type of i.riformation that
insurance agents may use in their sales presentations, called "illustrations."
Hunt, supra note 103, at 413-14. In life insurance illustrations, typically using
some sort of statistical software, the insurance agent "illustrates" for the potential
customer how much her cash value will be after a given period of time under a
�ven set of assumptions. Not surprisingly, many life-insurance purchasers
interpret these illustrations to be guarantees of the policy's return on investment.
For a description of the various ways in which life insurance illustrations can be
misleading and a somewhat critical view of the Model Regulation, see Hunt,
supra note 103, at 409-22.
107 Although some types of cash value policies start out with relatively low agent
commissions, over time agents gravitate toward those policies that par them the
highest commissions. For example, following the introduction of tlie universal
life" policy, although commissions were initially low, "[i]t did not take long
before a Kind of reverse competition set in the highest commission, least
consumer-oriented contract won the loyalty of agents." Hunt, supra note 103, at
407. In more recent years, the rate of return on cash value policies has radically
increased, in large part owing to market competition and the resulting
development of new cash vafue products that allow investor/ insureds to invest
in a range of mutual funds. Moreover, state regulatory innovations have
significantly reduced (though not eliminated) the worst of the misleading
marketing practices, so that now it is harder to hide administrative costs than it
once was. Still, cash value policies remain significantly more complex and
difficult to evaluate than do term policies, for reasons that are unclear.
108 See generally GARY s. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1991).
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model and have suggested alternative models.109 Further, there
is some evidence suggesting that household consumption
decisions depend to some extent on whether the husband or
the wife has the initial control over the resources . For example,
consumption patterns appear to vary depending on the relative
share of the household's income that is earned by each spouse.
Studies show, for example, that "increases in the wife's income
relative to that of the husband are associated with an increase
in expenditures on restaurant meals, child care, and women's
clothing, and with decreases in expenditures on alcohol and
tobacco. " 110 How this dynamic might apply to life insurance
purchases has not been studied. Still, one can tell a story along
these lines that might help to explain part of the
underinsurance problem. That is, for the most part, it will be
the primary earner (usually the husband) in the household who
ends up making the decision regarding life-insurance coverage.
Why? Because insurance agents tend to focus their efforts on
the primary earner; moreover, if employer-provided group
insurance is purchased, it typically will be through the
employer of the primary earner. In any event, the purchase of
life-insurance coverage on the life of the primary earner may be
a sort of household expenditure that gets neglected precisely
because the primary earner exercises disproportionate control
over household financial decisions. Why might this happen?
For one thing, it might be easier for a primary earner to
conclude that in the event of his or her death, the other spouse
will be expected to remarry or to get a paying job or a higher
paying job. The primary earner also could conclude that
consumption needs will be reduced as the family will be
expected to move to a smaller house. For now, these are just
speculations; further empirical research is necessary to pin
down the relationship between life-insurance adequacy and
relative income within the household. However, there is one
relevant finding in the Bernheim study. There, the authors
found that the degree of underinsurance strongly correlated
"What recent e mp i rical analysis p oints toward is that multi-person
households cannot be treated as single decision-makers and that household
allocations should probably rather lie considered as the outcome of some
interaction between household members with different preferences." Martin
Browning et al., Income and Outcomes: A Structural Mode[of Intrahousehold
Allocation, 102 J. POL. ECON. 1067, 169-70 (1994).
110 Henry E. Smith, Intermediate Filing in Household Taxation, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 145,
162-63 (1998) (reviewing the empirical literature on this issue).
109
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with the disparity between the income of the primary earner
and that of the secondary earner-that is, the greater the share of
income attributable to the primary earner, the greater the
shortfall in the insurance on the primary earner's life.111 This
finding seems consistent with both the idea that the primary
earner tends to exercise disproportionate control over the
income that he or she brings into the house and the idea that
the primary earner is inadequately altruistic with respect to the
rest of the household's needs.

C.

Summary

The theoretical arguments just reviewed in section B and
the findings summarized in section A above, taken separately
or together, do not amount to a definitive case for immediate
implementation of some new government program designed to
increase the level of life insurance coverage.
Rather, the
argument to this point should be sufficient to put the issue of
life-insurance adequacy squarely on the policymaking agenda
as well as on the agenda for future theoretical and empirical
research. The argument should also be sufficient to prompt an
initial, exploratory examination of possible policy responses. It
is this latter project that will occupy the remainder of this
article.

IV. DESIGNING THE OPTIMAL LIFE INSURANCE SUBSIDY

A.

Brief Note on Choosing

the Optimal Policy Design

If
we
are
persuaded
that
the
problem
of
underconsumption of life insurance is real and significant, the
next task is to determine the appropriate government response.
As mentioned above, Auerbach and Kotlikoff end their initial
studies with a sentence or two calling for either an expansion of
Social Security survivorship benefits or an expansion of
employer-provided group term coverage. However, any such
recommendations are expressly rejected in the more recent
Bernheim study. 112 Therefore, no one has made any effort to
elaborate on the policy implications of the underinsurance
problem in the life insurance context. This Part begins to fill
that gap in the literature.
111 BERNHEIM et al., supra note 2, at 30-49 tbl. 13
112 See generally BERNHEIM et. al, supra note 2.
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Before launching into a discussion of the various
regulatory approaches to the problem, consider first the least
intrusive solution: disclosure.
It may be that the principal
reason people purchase insufficient life insurance is that they
do not know how much is needed to sustain the household's
standard of living. It may be that the market alone cannot fully
correct this problem because, as argued above, people distrust
the recommendations about life-insurance needs given by
insurance agents. However, if these statements are true, the
only policy response necessary is to develop some way of
credibly informing households of their insurance needs should
they want to purchase enough life insurance to maintain their
household's standard of living. We could use a public service
announcement, paid for with tax dollars and endorsed by some
agency of the government, perhaps the Social Security
Administration. It could be some joint initiative, funded by the
life-insurance industry and certified by the government. One
can imagine a moving television advertisement that explains
the hardship a family can face if a primary earner dies and the
household is inadequately insured-followed by a listing of
websites that have insurance-needs calculators which have
been endorsed by the federal government.
Although such a solution might be sufficient to overcome
the problem, this article will focus on other regulatory
alternatives. As with the problem of insufficient retirement
savings, it is not enough just to remind people that they may
need to set aside more money now to provide for the future.
Rather, the following proposed solutions are based on the
assumption that more direct (and, alas, more expensive)
government involvement may be needed.
The following three categories represent a standard way of
organizing the range of regulatory responses to the problem of
an "underconsumed" good or service. Such a good or service
can be provided by the government, mandated by the
government, or subsidized by the government. Government
provided life insurance would involve payments made directly
by the government to the dependents after the death of the
insured, and the source of funding would be either a payroll
tax or income tax.
(Although existing social insurance
programs tend to be funded through payroll taxes, other
funding regimes are possible.) With government provided
insurance, government employees collect the revenue and
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administer the payment of benefits.
With government
mandated life insurance, on the other hand, the basic insurance
functions-underwriting (or risk assessment), premium
collection, and claims adjusting-would be performed by
private firms, but direct regulation would be introduced in the
form of compulsory coverage. The mandate could be directed
either at employers (as is the case, for example, with workers'
compensation insurance at the state level) or at individuals.
Government subsidized life insurance is a catch-all category
used to designate all other expenditures of public funds on life
insurance, whether as demand-side or supply-side subsidies or
whether in the form of direct expenditures or tax
expenditures.113
Each of these general categories of responses-government
provision, government mandate, and government subsidy-has
advantages and disadvantages, which will be summarized in
the sections that follow. It is worth noting in advance,
however, that in this country we rarely settle for only one of
these approaches. Instead, almost every area of the economy
that receives public funds does so through a combination of
approaches to public spending. Take health care, for example.
In addition to Medicaid and Medicare, which are types of
government-provided health insurance, there are a number of
healthcare tax expenditures, the largest of which is the
exclusion for employer provided medical care and health
insurance. Likewise with education, we have a mixture of
government provision and government subsidies: state and
local governments directly provide public elementary and
secondary education to virtually all children from kindergarten
to grade twelve, and there are state-funded and state-run
universities in all fifty states. Nevertheless, there are a number
of government-subsidy programs primarily for higher
education, some of which are tax expenditures (such as the
113 There are,

of course, many ways to draw the lines between these categories;
and no particular set of defutltions is correct or incorrect-just more or less useful.
For example, within the general cate�my of government subsidies, there is a
subcategory known as ilie "voucher, which was given a clear and useful
definition only recently. See DAVID F. BRADFORD & DANIEL V. SHAVIRO, THE
ECONOMICS OF VOUCHERS 1-2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
7092, 1999) (defining a voucher as a demand-side subsidy which leaves the
consumer with some level of choice among competing suppliers and which tends
to display a "marginal rate of reimbursement" of the subsidized activity of one
hundred percent up to a given point and zero percent thereafter).
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deduction for contributions to educational charities, the
exclusion for qualified scholarships, and the treabnent of
education IRAs) and some of which are indirect expenditures
(such as government guarantees for qualified student loans).
Life insurance is no different. To the extent the problem of
underconsumption of life insurance has been addressed
(apparently unsuccessfully), it has been through a combination
of government provision and government subsidies in the form
of tax expenditures. The government-provided life insurance
consists of Social Security survivorship benefits that are
available to the children, spouses, and dependent parents of
qualified individuals.
The principal tax expenditure is the
deferral (and in some cases outright exemption) of taxation on
the invesbnent earnings inside of cash value life insurance.114
Substantially smaller in scale are the exclusions for employer
paid premiums on up to $50,000 of group-term life insurance
and the various preferential tax rules for life insurance
companies, mainly consisting of special reserve deductions not
available to other firms.115
The next two sections discuss the theoretical pros and cons
of these three general approaches.
Section B briefly
summarizes the principal strengths and weaknesses of
government-provided and government-mandated insurance
and contrasts the two with each other. Section C provides a
separate discussion of a government-subsidy approach. The
focus in that section is on the u se of a demand-side price
subsidy for term life-insurance premiums-either a tax
deduction or credit or perhaps a voucher for life-insurance
premiums-and it highlights a few of the implementation issues
that such a subsidy would present.
Although there are a
number of advantages to a demand-side price subsidy (when
compared
with
government-provided
or
government
mandated insurance), a deduction or credit should not be the
only response. Rather, as suggested above, probably the best
response is a combination of approaches, which will be
discussed in the following section.

In 2000, the amount spent on this tax expenditure was estimated to be $13.5
billion. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GoVERNMENT:
FISCAL YEAR 2002, ch. 5 tbl. 5-1 (2001).
115 In 1998 the amount spent on this tax expenditure was estimated to be $2
billion. Id.
114
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Government Provision versus Government Mandate

Both government-provided and government-mandated
insurance have one advantage over government-subsidized
insurance: they avoid the problem of adverse selection. As
described in Part III.B . 1 . above, adverse selection occurs when
relatively high-risk individuals,
knowing (or at least
suspecting) that they are relatively high risk, find insurance
prices to be a relatively good deal, and therefore tend to self
select into insurance pools. As a result, premiums rise; low risk
individuals buy less insurance; and the process tends to feed on
itself, resulting in some risk-averse individuals not being able
to purchase coverage that would have been available in the
absence of adverse selection. 116
Adverse selection is completely eliminated, however, if the
insurance coverage is provided or mandated by · the
government, to the extent that individual choice regarding the
level of coverage is eliminated. This argument often has been
used in support of various universal health insurance
proposals. It could be applied to life insurance as well. That is,
if the government were provided every household that had
dependents with (or mandated that all of those households
buy) some set level of life insurance coverage, there would be
little room for adverse selection, as there would be little
opportunity for individual choice.
But this reduction in choice is also at the heart of the
criticisms of mandatory and government provided insurance.
With
government provided
insurance,
individuals
or
households would have no say in answering what might be
considered highly personal and idiosyncratic questions: how
much insurance is to be provided, whose life is to be insured,
who are the beneficiaries of the insurance to be, how are the
benefits to be paid out, how long will the coverage remain in
force, and who will be the insurance provider.
The only
difference with mandatory insurance is that the choice among
providers is preserved. 117 Some might consider this inhibition
116 Theoretically, insurance pools can unravel entirely, leaving everyone
uninsured.
117 It is possible to imagine a government-provided life insurance program that
provides a range of options. A person mi17ht be allowed to select different levels
of coverage, which would carry different premiums." But such a regime would
be a dramatic departure from fhe way in wbich government has always
provided social insurance in this country. Likewise, it is also possible to imagine
a mandatory insurance regime that left some degree of choice regarding the
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of individual choice a reason itself to oppose such programs
because of the conflict with basic liberal notions of consumer
sovereignty and individual autonomy.
At this point, the reader understandably might ask the
following question: was it not with respect to just those sorts of
choices that we decided (in Part II above) that because of
myopia and extemality concerns, households' unsubsidized
decisions are not to be trusted? If households have a tendency
to purchase too little life insurance coverage, to allow those
households broad discretion in choosing their level of life
insurance may seem unwise.
Put differently, it could be
argued that the concern for preserving individual choice in
insurance decision-making necessarily contradicts this article's
concern for the problem of underinsurance. That conclusion,
however, is both true and false. It is true that, when we say
there is a tendency to purchase "too little" life insurance, the
amount and duration of coverage are precisely the sorts of
consumption choices we have in mind. However, to say that
something is underconsumed is not to say those individuals'
preferences regarding its consumption are irrelevant.
As
emphasized throughout, determining the "right" amount of life
insurance is extremely difficult as a conceptual matter.
(Indeed, that was the main conclusion of Part I.) One way of
incorporating a measure of policy-making humility with
respect to the question would be to preserve a degree of
consumer choice. Thus, although there may be reasons to
encourage or even require households to purchase more life
insurance than they otherwise would, we also want to preserve
some element of individual or household choice in the matter.
As to the choice between mandatory insurance and
government-provided insurance, a sizable literature has
developed, though none of it speaks directly to the topic of life
insurance. 1 18 Perhaps the best-known example is the recent
debate over universal health care. In the late 1 980s and early
1990s, there was much talk of providing health insurance

nature of the life insurance coverage to individuals. To the extent the mandatory
regime preserves consumer choice in that way, it would be more like the
government subsidy regime described in the next section.
ns For a review of the literature and an interesting and revealing application, see
Jonathan Gruber & Alan B. Krueger, The Incidence ofMandated cmp1oyer-Prauided
Insurance: Lessons from Workers' Compensation, in 5 TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY

111 (1991).
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coverage to all Americans. Among those pushing for universal
coverage, vigorous debate existed about how to achieve that
goal most effectively: government provision, in the form of a
Canadian-style, single-payer regime, or government mandate,
imposed on either employers or individuals.
One potential benefit of mandated insurance over
government-provided insurance is the element of competition
among suppliers.
With mandatory insurance, whether the
mandate is imposed on employers or individuals, there
By contrast, such
remains some choice among suppliers.
competition is believed to be especially important in the
With health insurance, there are
context of health care.
numerous dimensions with respect to which competition can
occur; and health insurance policies can differ significantly in
terms of what medical expenses are covered, the degree of
flexibility in choosing health-care providers, and so on.
However, whether flexibility and competition among suppliers
are as important a concern with life insurance as it is with
health insurance is unclear. With pure term insurance, the
policies tend to be fairly standardized, with competition being
primarily over the price rather than the terms of coverage . 11 9
Another reason often given for favoring employer
mandates over direct provision is the claim that mandates
create "fewer distortions of economic activity" than do
government provided benefits funded by a payroll or income
tax. 120 The best way to understand this point is to compare the
effect of a mandate with the effect of a payroll tax on
equilibrium wages and employment. According to standard
economic analysis, the introduction of a payroll tax will result
in a decrease in employment because it increases employers'
costs, and will assume some elasticity in the labor supply. But
this effect will be mitigated by a reduction in wages, so long as
labor supply is not perfectly elastic. As it turns out, evidence
suggests that labor supply, in the short run, is fairly inelastic,
meaning a payroll tax theoretically could cause considerable
unemployment.121 An employer mandate, on the other hand,
1 19 Compare Single Payer System Picks Up Momentum IfHealth Care a la Canada Gains
Grass Roots Support", USA TODAY, Thursday, April 28 (1994); with Steven
Findlay, The Argument for an Employer Man date 12 Bus. & HEALTH 58 (1994) .
1 20 See, e.g., Summers, supra note 90, at 181; Gruber & Krueger, supra note 118, at
1 15-16.
121 This whole analysis assumes, as is standard in public finance economics, that
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has a different effect from a payroll tax, insofar as the
employees place a value on the benefit being provided.
Because they value the benefit, employees are willing to accept
a decrease in wages in exchange. As a result, the reduction in
employment caused by the mandate is not as severe as that
caused by the payroll tax.122 This idea is sometimes called the
theory of
"compensating wage differentials." Under this
theory, when employees value the mandated benefit more,
fewer jobs will be lost as a result. On the other hand, when
employees value the benefit less, the mandate has the effect of a
pure payroll tax, thereby worsening the employment effects.123
Government mandates also have some disadvantages
when compared with government provision. First, consider a
few of the standard criticisms that have special application to
employer mandates. For one thing, the job-protecting effects of
employer mandates disappear if there are wage rigidities, such
as a binding minimum wage, that prevent wages from falling
to compensate employers for providing the mandated
benefit.124
Second, mandating that employers provide life
insurance to their employees does nothing for the self
employed or the temporarily unemployed. Thus, if universally
provided life insurance is seen as an important goal, perhaps
government provision (or even individual mandates) would be
preferable to employer mandates.125
Third, to the extent
unemployment caused by taxation is worse than reduced wages caused bv
'
taxation.
122 Gruber & Krueger, supra note 118, at 113.
123 Summers captures the point as follows: "In terms of their allocational effects
on employment, mandated benefits represent a tax at a rate equal to the difference
between the employer's cost of providing the benefit and the employee's
valuation of it, not at a rate equal to the cost to the employer of providing the
benefit." Summers, supra note 90, at 180-81 (emphasis in original).
124 Summers, supra note 90, at 181-182. It is possible that "wage rigidities" may
be more prevalent than proponents of employer mandates would1ead us to
believe. Empirical research in labor economics has not been able to consistently
document compensating wage differentials. Gruber & Kruger, supra note 1 18, at
1 1 3. However, the prob1em may be with the nature of the data and the
approaches taken by the researchers. In an analysis of workers' compensation
insurance data from all fifty states, Gruber and Kruger found substantial
evidence of both cost shifting from employers to employees and little effect on
employment. Id.
125 Of course, an individual mandate would apply to nonemployees as well. In
any event, whether a government mandate is imposed on employees or on
individuals, if the goal is universal provision, there will be a need for some
additional subsidiiation of low-income individuals. For a recent analysis of the
comparative distributional and efficiency effects of government-mandated
versus government-provided health insurance, see Charles L. Ballard & John H.
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employer mandates provide an efficiency advantage because of
the compensating wage differentials, they inhibit the
government's ability to accomplish redistributive goals
through the provision of the benefit. Finally, government
mandates tend to be more hidden from public scrutiny and
political accountability than are other ways of funding
universal insurance, such as taxes.126
An individual mandate-that is, a law that compels
individuals to purchase a given level of life insurance rather
requiring their employers to provide it-would avoid some of
the problems just listed, but would present problems of its
own. For example, a truly universal mandatory insurance
regime would require that some type of cash or tax subsidy be
provided to low-income households. In fact, compulsory life
insurance could not exist without some degree of government
subsidy as well. Finally, and perhaps most significantly,
mandatory insurance, like government-provided insurance,
would eliminate the element of individual choice as to the
appropriate amount of life insurance.
Given the benefit of avoiding adverse selection, an
argument could be made that some form of government
mandated or government-provided life insurance would be an
appropriate response to the insufficient demand for life
insurance. Moreover, because we already have a fairly well
developed system of government-provided life insurance-that
is, the survivorship program-which would be extremely costly
and politically impossible to replace, it is safe to assume that a
version of the survivorship program will be preserved. With
that in mind, the next section briefly summarizes the level of
coverage provided under the survivorship regime. Then, the
article turns to a discussion of how tax subsidies might be used
to supplement that regime.
C.

Social Security Survivorship Benefits: The Current Regime of
Government Provided Life Insurance
Although currently we have no program of government-

Goddeeris, Financing Universal Health Care in the United States: A General

Equilibrium Analysis of Efficiency and Distributional Effects, 52 NAT'L TAXJ. 31
(1999).

126 Indeed, it can be argued that the principal motivation behind the push for
employer mandates in the health insurance context is not the pursuit of efficiency

but a desire to hide the costs of healthcare reform.
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mandated life insurance, we do have government-provided life
insurance. The Social Security survivorship program gives a
limited amount of coverage to the families of individuals who
have worked and paid into the Social Security system for a
sufficient period of time, provided that the beneficiaries meet
certain eligibility requirements. 127 Survivorship benefits are
part of the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
(OASDI) Program contained in Title II of the Social Security
Act. 1 28 In general, spouses and dependent parents are eligible
for survivorship benefits only if the deceased worker was
"fully insured," which depends on how long the worker
worked and paid into the system.129 In addition to the "fully
insured requirement, surviving spouses who are not taking
care of young children must meet two other requirements to
qualify for benefits. First, they must be unmarried; and second,
they must be either sixty years old or older, or they must be
between fifty and fifty-nine and disabled throughout a five
month waiting period.130 Surviving children under the age of
eighteen, and surviving spouses who have not remarried and
who are taking care of the breadwinner's under-age-sixteen
children qualify for benefits even if the worker was not fully
insured, so long as he was "currently insured," which means
that he should have worked and paid into the system for one
and a half years during the three years before his death . 131
Even for individuals who qualify for survivorship benefits,
the actual payments are meager, especially for middle- and
upper-income families. The benefits are a function of the
deceased worker's "primary insurance amount" (PIA), which is
the monthly benefit amount payable to the worker if he retires
at full retirement age or becomes entitled to disability
benefits.132 The PIA is based on the worker's average earnings
over his or her working lifetime.133 The PIA itself replaces only
a fraction of the insured worker's income; and the higher the
worker's average career income, the smaller the replacement

121 GREEN BOOK, supra note 10, at 5.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 12.
130 Id. at 15.

131 There are also special rules for surviving children who are disabled.
132 Id. at 116.
133 Id.

Id.
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ratio.134 Thus, for a worker born in 1935 who retires in 2000 at
full retirement age after a full-time career with steady earnings,
the PIA would replace fifty-eight percent of his earnings if he
were a low-wage earner (defined as earning forty-five percent
of the Social Security average wage index), forty-three percent
of his earnings if he were an average-wage earner (defined as
earning the Social Security average wage index), and only
twenty-five percent if he earned the maximum wage taxable for
Social Security purposes (which currently is
in the
neighborhood of $63,000).135
The relationship is somewhat arbitrary between the
breadwinner's PIA and the survivorship benefits that
dependents receive if the breadwinner dies. The breadwinner's
young children136 and surviving spouses taking care of young
children137 each receive seventy-five percent of the deceased' s
PIA.138
However, the surviving spouse's benefit will be
reduced if he or she earns above a certain amount139 and will be
eliminated if he or she remarries .140 The total survivorship
benefit payable on account of a given worker's death, however,
is capped at between one hundred fifty percent and one
hundred eighty percent of the worker's PIA. 141
The following example illustrates the annual survivorship
benefits that would be received by a typical household in

134 See id. at 26-27.

135 Id. at 27, tbl. 1-17.
136 To qualify for benefits, a surviving child must be under the age of eighteen
(or, if a full-time elementary or secondary student, under the age of nineteen). Id.
at 15. If the child is disabled before turning twenty-two, she can receive
survivorship benefits beyond the age of eighteen. Id.
137 Oddly, for the spouse to qualify for these benefits, the child must be under
sixteen rather than under eighteen or nineteen, the ages that determine the limits
of the child's benefits. Id.
138 Id. at 26. Surviving spouses can be eligible to receive survivorship benefits
them:-elves-an� �ot merely �s 0-e custodians of th� worker's young children-but
only if the surv1vmg spouse is dISabled or over a given age. For example,
widows or widowers who are age sixty (or disabled and between fifty and fiftv
nine) can receive benefits equal to 71 .5"% of the deceased breadwinner's PIA. fd.
139 SOc. SEC. AoMrN., Pus. No.05-10069, SooAL SEcURITY: How WoRK AFFEcrs
YOUR BENEFITS (1999). In general, if the surviving spouse is under the age of
sixty-five, for every $2 he or she earns in excess of $9,600, $1 in survivorship
benefits is lost. Id. at 1. The first $9,600 of earnings have no effect on the
spouse's survivorship benefits. None of the spouse's earnings affects the
surviving child's survivorship benefits. SOc. SEC. ADMIN., Pus. No.05-10084,
S0cIAL SECURITY: SURVIVORS BENEFITS, 6 (1998).
140 GREEN BOOK, supra note 10, at 15.
141 SSA, supra note 139.
·
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Assume the hypothetical
which a breadwinner has died.
breadwinner worked full time and paid into the social security
system for twenty-two years before dying in 1995 at the age of
forty. Assume further that a spouse and two young children
survive the deceased worker. The annual survivorship benefits
received by the household (so long as the children were under
the age of sixteen and assuming the surviving spouse earns no
more than $9,600 per year and does not remarry) would have
depended on the breadwinner's yearly income as follows: 1) H
the breadwinner had yearly earnings equal to the federal
minimum wage, the annual survivorship benefit would have
been $9,912; 2) if the breadwinner had yearly earnings equal to
the average wage (approximately $26,000), the survivorship
benefit would have been $16,440; and 3) if the breadwinner
had yearly earnings equal to or greater than the maximum
wage taken into account for Social Security taxation purposes
(approximately $63,000), the survivorship benefit would have
been $26,304.142 These household benefits would continue to be
paid until the children reached the relevant age limit and
would be reduced if the surviving spouse earned above the
$9,600 threshold or remarried.
Whether Social Security provides the ideal government
provided life-insurance program is open to question. First, the
level of benefits may be inadequate. Although it makes sense
to link the amount of benefits to the deceased worker's income,
tying the benefits to the worker's PIA-which is based on the
worker's lifetime average earnings, adjusted for inflation-may
be worth reconsidering. Arguably, a more accurate measure of
the financial value of the worker to the household would be
some measure of the worker's income at time of death.
Whereas the PIA seems an appropriate measure to use in
determining a person's Social Security retirement benefit (since,
in retirement, most individuals can expect their living expenses
to be lower than during their younger working years), the PIA
seems the wrong amount on which to base a life-insurance
calculation. In cases involving relatively young families, living
expenses will tend to increase rather than decrease, especially if
the children expect to go to college.143
142 GREEN BOOK, supra note 10, at tbL 1-10.
143 It could be argued that the survivorship

program responds to this precise
concern by allowing special benefits for young children of deceased workers and
for surviving spouses who are taking care of those children and by awarding a
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Other aspects of the survivorship program involve hidden
assumptions that are certainly defensible but deserve careful
scrutiny.
For example, the program assumes that, if a
surviving spouse receiving survivorship benefits remarries, the
spouse's benefits will stop.144 In addition, if the surviving
spouse takes a job, his or her survivorship benefits can be
reduced. These rules imply a certain austerity in the program
that may be consistent with the majority's view of the optimal
life insurance contract, but it may not.145 The program also
assumes that children will be self-sufficient when they reach
the age of eighteen, or, if full-time students, nineteen. Some
might feel that the benefits should continue until the child
reaches the average age of college graduation, although the
current assumption certainly is defensible.146 And finally, that
the current survivorship benefits are skewed to provide
disproportionately large benefits to relatively low-income
households seems consistent with this country's historical
preference for progression.147
Obviously, much more could be said about the merits and
demerits of the current survivorship program; however, the
purpose of this section is not to offer a systematic assessment of
that program. Rather, the point is just to start the discussion.
For the remainder of this article, however, the author will
assume that some version of the current survivorship
program-one that continues to provide a modest amount of
income replacement for a large number of households and a
significant amount of income replacement for the very lowest
income households-will continue to exist. Seeing that the
existence of this regime has not eliminated the underinsurance
problem thus far, I will focus on possible ways of
supplementing the survivorship program with additional
government subsidies for life insurance.

maximum household benefit equal to one hundred eighty percent of the
deceased' s PIA.
144 GREEN BOOK, supra note 10, at 15.
145 This also affects the surviving spouse's marginal income tax rate of the phase
out of benefit for earnings over $9600. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
146 Recall that the same assumption-children are part of the household until a e
�
eighteen-was also made by Bernheim study. See supra note 2 and accompanymg
text.
147 For the same reason, the relatively regressive way in which the survivorship
benefits are funded-through a payroll tax-is vulnerable to criticism.
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Government Subsidized Life Insurance

Continuing with our assumption that life insurance tends
to be underconsumed, this section explores the benefits and
costs of using some sort of government subsidy to encourage
households to purchase life insurance coverage on their
primary earners (and perhaps on secondary earners and
caregivers as well) . This section begins by exploring some of
the advantages and disadvantages of government subsidies
generally, of which tax preferences-such as special deductions,
exclusions, and credits-are only one variety. Then this section
offers some thoughts about several issues of implementation:
whether the price-subsidy should take the form of a tax
expenditure or a direct expenditure; whether, if a tax
expenditure is chosen, a deduction or a credit makes more
sense; and whether and to what extent the subsidy should be
targeted to achieve optimal effect.

1.

The Advantages o f Demand-Side Price Subsidies

Most of the advantages of government subsidy can be
inferred from what was said above in criticism of government
provided and government-mandated insurance. The biggest
comparative advantage of the subsidy approach (as compared
with the government-provision or government-mandate
approaches) is the preservation of consumer choice and
supplier competition. How important those two factors are to
the efficient workings of the life insurance market will
determine whether a government-subsidy approach should be
adopted. But first, let us be sure we understand what we mean
by a government subsidy. For the purposes of this article, a
government subsidy is a simple price subsidy; that is, the
government pays part of the cost of purchasing life insurance.
However, the individual or the household determines how
much insurance coverage to purchase and from which
insurance company.
Examples of price subsidies abound. A tax preference,
such as a deduction or credit, is a species of price subsidy. If
the
the
taxpayer makes a tax-preferred expenditure,
government shares the cost by reducing taxpayer's tax liability.
In the case of a deduction, the price subsidy is equal to the
taxpayer's marginal tax rate (because the deduction reduces his
or her tax liability by the amount of the deduction times the

2001]

THE CURRENT LIFE INS URANCE CRISIS

51

applicable marginal tax rate) . In the case of a tax credit, the
price subsidy is equal to the credit, which typically is a given
percentage (usually less than one hundred percent) of the
expenditure up to some set maximum amount. Credits differ
from deductions in that credits, unlike deductions, do not
reduce the tax base; rather, the amount of the credit is taken
directly out of the taxpayer's tax liability.148 Another type of
price subsidy is the voucher, which usually reimburses one
hundred percent of the costs of the designated good or service
up to a set amount and no more.
Food stamps are the
quintessential example.149 A price subsidy can have both a
substitution effect and an income effect.150 The substitution
effect is the increase in consumption of the good caused by the
decrease in the relative price of the good (when compared to all
non-subsidized substitute goods) due to the subsidy.
The
income effect is the change in the level of consumption in the
good due solely to the taxpayer's increased household income,
owing to the subsidy.
For goods called " normal goods,"
increased household income leads to increased consumption.1 51
Thus, if the expenditure being subsidized is a normal good or
service, the two effects-substitution and income-will cut in the
same direction: toward increased consumption.1 52
The price-subsidy approach has a number of potential
advantages over direct government provision. First, consider
one final word on behalf of " consumer choice" and " supplier
competition." It has been a widely held view that individuals
deciding how to invest their own resources generally are better
cost monitors than government bureaucrats deciding how to
invest tax dollars.153 Thus, for example, competition among

148 In theory, by use of refundable credits or something similar, this approach can
be applied to households that owe no taxes. In practice, refundable tax
expenditures are relatively rare.
149 BRADFORD & SHAVIRO, supra note 113, at 7.
150 ROSEN, supra note 87, at 28.
151 Id.
152 It is the substitution effect (caused by the change in relative prices) that is

important from the perspective of correcting the underinsurance problem,
insofar as the problem cferives from myopia or externalities with respect to life
insurance in particular. For a discussion of the complications that arise when the
deduction or credit has a cap or a floor, see CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX

(1985).
153 "The classic argument for competitive private supply, going back to Adam

POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING 40-46

Smith's 'invisible hand,' is that the profit motive, when combined with the need
to satisfy customers who have other options in order to get their business, is the
best available goad to inducing both economizing behavior in production and
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charitable organizations for tax-deductible contributions from
individual and institutional donors may induce a more efficient
provision of the organizations' various charitable functions
than would, say, the competition for government grants, which
are doled out by government employees who are spending
only public money. 154 The same could be true in the life
insurance context.
We may prefer to rely on competition
among life insurance companies for individual customers as a
means of inducing efficient provision of insurance benefits
rather than to rely on the Social Security bureaucracy to do the
job.
A second related advantage of price subsidies over direct
government provision is the possibility of increased efficiency
in the following peculiar sense: if we conceive of the life
insurance problem as an issue of distributional equity creating
a need to move dollars from the pockets of the relatively
wealthy (living breadwinners) and into the pockets of the
relatively poor (dependents whose providers have recently
died) the question becomes what is the most efficient, least
distorted means of achieving that objective. Put differently, we
can conceive of the life-insurance question as raising a question
of generational equity, albeit intra-family generational equity.
Under that conception, if a breadwinner has a price elasticity of
demand for making transfers to his or her dependent
beneficiaries that is greater than one (in absolute value), a
dollar of price subsidy will induce the breadwinner to purchase
more than a dollar of life insurance.155 So long as the elasticity
condition holds, the government gets more bang for the buck
by using a price subsidy than it would get by making the
expenditure direc tly . 1 56
Price elasticities of demand have been studied extensively
in the context of charitable contributions. The studies show
that for middle- and upper-income individuals, the price
socially valuable innovation." BRADFORD & SHAVIRO, supra note 113, at 46.
154 Id. at 29. This article will ar ue that a supply-side tax preference is less likely
g
to have this beneficial monitonng effect.
155 CWTFELTER, supra note 152, at 60 (1985)
l56 CWI'FELTER, supra note 152, at 281; Feldstein, supra note 93, at 303. It is also
possible that if the government sends a dollar of direct subsidy to the beneficiary,
the breadwinner would respond by reducing his transfer to the beneficiary by a
dollar (or something less than a dollar). ThiS is the "crowding out" effect, and it
can mean that the government will have to spend more than a dollar on life
insurance to get a full dollar transferred to ilie beneficiary.
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elasticity of demand is indeed greater than one.157 It is possible
that the same might be true of expenditures on life insurance,
in which case a price subsidy approach would be a "more
efficient" means of achieving this redistributional vision of life
insurance than would expanded survivorship benefits .158
Given the relatively low marginal rates currently imposed on
individual income, however, it might be necessary to provide
either a " double" deduction or to use a relatively high credit
percentage to achieve the same effect.159 Before this analysis is
taken too far, however, there obviously needs to be empirical
research done on the elasticity of intra-family giving patterns.
Even if one believes in the general consumer-sovereignty
and supplier-competition benefits of demand-side price
subsidies (and perhaps the bang-for-the-buck story), there
remain issues of program design. For example, to use Bradford
and Shaviro's terminology, a choice has to be made regarding
the "marginal reimbursement rate" [MRR], which is the
"percentage of a dollar of extra expenditure for an earmarked
commodity that the government, rather than the consumer,
would bear ." 160 As the authors observe, the characteristic MRR
for the demand-side price subsidy called a voucher is one
hundred percent up to a point and then zero percent thereafter.
157 See generally id, at 274 (summarizing studies, which consistently found price
elasticities greater than one in absolute value for all but the lowest income
groups; for1ow-income groups, the studies were inconclusive); Charles T.
Clotfelter & C. Eugene Steuerle, Charitable Contributions, in How TAXF5 AFFECT
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 403, 436 (1981) (finding highest price elasticities in higher
income groups).
158 It might be argued that shifting money from the pockets of rich breadwinners
into the pockets of their slightly less rich children or spouses contradicts the
principles of progression tliat Iead us to enact a graduated income and estate
and-gift tax in the first place. That is a fair complaint. However, a partial
response to the complaint would be to target the subsidy at relative1y young
high-income housenolds, which will tend not to be the very wealthiest taxpayers.
Sti11, it cannot be denied that this policy response will tend to benefit high
income individuals. However, recall that we are assuming at this point that
Social Security survivorship benefits will be dealing with the underinsurance
problem for the low-income households. And unless we have decided that
myopia and extemality justifications for government intervention only apply if
the affected parties are relatively poor, then a life-insurance subsidy that tends to
benefit individuals in the middle- and upper-income brackets needs no special
defense, other than the sort offered in Part 11.B above.
159 Cf. COMM'N ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUB. NEEDS, 1 RESEARCH PAPERS 4
(1917) (proposing a 200 percent charitable contribution deduction for individuals
with incomes less than $15,000 and a 150 percent deduction for those with
incomes between $15,000 and $30,000).
1 60 BRADFORD & SHAVIRO, supra note 113, at 29-30.
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By contrast, the MRR for a tax deduction, one that has no floor
or ceiling, would be equal to the taxpayer's marginal tax rate;
and that for a credit would be equal to the credit percentage.
Which of these structures is to be preferred will depend upon
the justification for the subsidy in the first place. For example,
if we believe that individuals tend to undervalue life insurance
by twenty percent of its cost, we might provide a twenty
percent credit or, for taxpayers with marginal rates
approximating twenty percent, an unlimited deduction.
Alternatively, if we thought that it was irrational for a
household not to have at least some minimal amount of life
insurance, we might use the voucher approach and set the
cutoff at the desired minimum .161
Another structural question is why the subsidy should be
located on the demand side rather than the supply side. It is
possible that the same benefits associated with price subsidies
could be achieved through some sort of subsidy to life
insurance companies rather than to life insurance purchasers. For
example, previous versions of the Code contained what were
considered substantial tax preferences for life insurance
companies, mainly in the form of special reserve deductions
not available to other firms.1 62
Such preferences, in a
competitive market, would reduce the cost of life insurance to
consumers (as compared to a world without such special
reserve deductions), which would have the effect of
subsidizing life insurance purchases. Notice that this approach
too, in its idealized form, would be consistent with consumer
sovereignty and provide for supplier competition, if we think
those values are worth promoting.

161 Id. at 31-32 (making these points using the example of underconsumption of
food). Price subsidies always present a tradeoff between encouraging consumers
to make the underconsumed expenditure (the so-called merit gooo) and s!ill
encouraging cost consciousness on the part of consumers. Id. at 29. For example,
it is often argued that the exclusion for employer rovided health insurance
blunts the taxpayers' awareness of the full costs o their healthcare consumption
decisions and thus has contributed to the over consumption of healthcare. A
common recommendation, therefore, is to cap the amount of the exclusion at
some level of minimum, but decent, health insurance coverage. That
recommendation might be a good idea; however, it should oe noted that
considerable doubt remains as to the relationship between the tax exclusion and
the healthcare-overspending problem. It could be argued that skyrocketing
healthcare costs were caused more by the old fee-for-service financing structure
than from the tax exclusion, although both may have played a role.
162 Those preferences were apparently reduced but not eliminated by the 1984
Deficit Reduction Act.

y
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However, it is questionable whether the effect would be
the same as a demand-side price subsidy. For example, one
wonders whether an individual would be motivated by a cost
reduction in life insurance stemming from a supply-side
subsidy in the same way that he would be motivated by an
insurance deduction, credit, or voucher. Also, as compared
with a demand-side subsidy, a supply-side subsidy may
involve a larger oversight role on the part of government
agencies, which still must decide which firms get the tax
benefit.1 63 Still, if it could be shown that a supply-side subsidy
would as effective, such an approach could be used instead of
or in combination with a premium deduction.

2.

Assorted Issues of Implementation

Even if it is decided that a demand-side price subsidy for
life insurance would be a useful supplement to the existing or a
revised Social Security survivorship program, many issues of
implementation remain to be considered.
This section
highlights a few of those issues.

a.

The

Tax Expenditure Debate

A
large
literature
exploring
the
efficiency
and
distributional consequences of using tax preferences to
accomplish social policy already exists. Much has been written
over the years on the idea of a comprehensive tax base ("CTB"),
as zealous supporters of the CTB have called into question the
use of "tax expenditures"164 and anti-CTBers have questioned
the coherence and validity of the CTB idea1;165 and I will not re
plow all of that ground here.
But a few points are worth
emphasizing.
I generally tend to side with the anti-CTBers (that is, the
163 Demand-side subsidies, however, can require substantial a ency oversight as
g
well. For example, the Treasury Department maintains some involvement (at

times considerable involvement) in aetermining what counts as a "charitable

contribution."

See, e.g., Stanley Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Devicefor Implementin{ Govemment
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. . REV. 705
(1970); Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches
Necessary to Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Governmental Assistance, 84 HARV.
L. REv. 352 (1970) .
165 B oris Bittker, A Comprehensive Tax Base as a Goal ofIncome Tax Reform, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 925 (1967); Boris Bittker, Accounting for Federal "Tax Subsidies" in the
National Budget, 22 NAT'L TAX J. 244 (1969); bouglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey S. Lehman,
Tax Expenditure Budgets: A Critical View, 54 TAX NoTFS 1661 (1992).
164
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critics of the anti-tax-expenditure position) in two respects.
First, I am skeptical of any suggestion that there is a "pure" tax
base (whether it be an ideal accretion tax or an ideal
consumption tax) that should be granted a presumption of
superiority. Thus, I tend to agree that whether a particular tax
expenditure provision is a good or bad idea turns not on issues
of "correct" measurement of the tax base, but on the questions
of efficiency and equity that are standard fare of public finance
economists.
Second, tax-expenditure critiques tend to
exaggerate the disadvantages and understate or ignore the
potential advantages of using tax subsidies to achieve social
policy. For example, complaints that tax preferences increase
the complexity of the tax laws seem to ignore the fact that some
amount of complexity and administrative costs are inherent in
the use of any subsidy, wherever that subsidy is located. It is
not clear why those complexity costs are greater for tax
expenditures than for direct expenditures.
Another criticism often made of tax subsidies is that they
are overbroad. According to this argument, essentially we are
throwing money away if some individuals who receive the tax
subsidy would have engaged in the targeted activity
anyway.166
While this is true enough, the over breadth
complaint can be applied to any price subsidy, whether it is in
the tax code or not and whether it is a deduction or a credit.167
Inevitably there is a tradeoff between a subsidy's accuracy (that
is, the extent to which it is tailored so as to apply only to
marginal consumers of the good or service in question) and the
subsidy's complexity; and that tradeoff exists wherever the
subsidy is located .168
166 More precisely, the subsidy in such a case has the effect of a purely
redistributive cash transfer rather than a price subsidy.
167 See generally BRADFORD & SHAVIRO, supra note 113, at 18-24 (explaining
circumstances in which a price subsidy-in their case, 'a voucher-is a cash
equivalent transfer).
168 For more of my skeptical take on tax-exceptionalism arguments, see Kyle D.
Logue, If Taxpayers Can't Be Fooled, Maybe Cong_ress Can: Applying Public Choice
Theory to Tax Transitions, 67 CHI. L. REV. 1507 (2000). Two complaints about tax
expenditures that may have special application to the tax law arena and that
therefore deserve close attention are the lack-of-regular-legislative-review
concern (because they tend to be a permanent part of the Code) and the lack-of
administrative-expertise concern (liecause the IRS is asked to administer social
policy in realms outside of its area of competence). For a discussion of ways to
overcome these potentialJ;!Oblems, see Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income
Taxes: The Rehabilitation of lax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973 (1986); Edward A.
Zelinksy, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural Defense of
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Finally,
tax-expenditure
critiques
almost
always
downplay, if not ignore, the potential cost savings of using tax
laws to implement social policy. The possibility of such cost
savings was one of the original justifications for the use of tax
expenditure provisions as subsidies, and in some cases that
argument still makes sense. In the case of the life insurance
subsidy, for example, clearly there would be a cost advantage
to using the already existing tax system and its ability to reach
a broad group of individuals rather than creating an entirely
new voucher system. Nevertheless, if this administrative-cost
advantage of tax subsidies proves to be false, I would certainly
recommend consideration of a voucher alternative.

b.

Deduction or credit ?

If we decide to go with demand-side tax expenditure for
life insurance, still we must decide whether to use a deduction
or credit.169 The basic difference between the two has already
Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165 (1993); Edward A.
Zelinsky, Are Tax "Benefits" Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 112
HARV. L. REV. 379 (199S).

169 There is an efficiency argument that would favor using a deduction over a

credit, and it is based on the welfarist model of altruistic giving. According to
that model, the existence of altruism creates a type of externality that will, in the
absence of a subsidy, mean that the altruistic purchase of life insurance always
will always be suboptimal. As it turns out, the size of the optimal subsidy is
inversely related to the degree of the giver's altruism. Thus, the more altruistic
the giver is, the smaller the subsidy sliould be; likewise, a less altruistic giver
needs a larger subsidy, relatively speaking. At the limit, the least altruistic
givers-those who experience a little increase in utility because someone else's
utility is increased-should get a subsidy that approaches the value of the gift
itself. Although this may seem counterintuitive to the non-welfarist, it actually
makes sense within the welfarist model when we remember that less altruistic
givers by definition give less weight to the beneficiary's utility than do more
altruistic givers; therefore, the former need more encouragement to give than do
the latter. Kaflow & Shavell, supra note 7, at 970. An interesting policy
implication o this analysis is that a high-income individual who makes a gift
that is equal to that of a low-income individual should receive a greater subsidy
because of the former's relative lack of altruism (as evidenced by the size of their
gifts relative to their incomes). There are a number of possible objections that
could be raised to this model from outside of the welfarist perspective. For one
example, it could be argued that altruism itself is a praiseworthy characteristic
and that larger degrees of altruism are more praiseworthy than smaller degrees
of altruism, such that the welfare-maximizing subsidy-which offers rewards in
just the opposite way :--would be perverse in the extreme. Kaplow anticipates the
IJOSsibility of such objections. Id. at 971 n.12. That is precisely what a deduction
does. In a system of progressive tax rates, if two taxpayers have deductible
expenses of equal size, tfie deduction will be more valuable to the high-bracket
taxpayer than to the low-bracket taxpayer. Thus, at least on efficiency grounds, a
deduction may be preferable to a credit, which does not have those
characteristics. Id. at 476.
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been mentioned. The value of a deduction to the household is
a function of the household's marginal tax rate; whereas the
value of a credit is a function of whatever credit percentage
Congress sets when it enacts the credit.
As a result, tax
expenditures in the form of deductions are often criticized as
being distributionally unfair because they disproportionately
benefit households with relatively high incomes-households
that, in our system of progressive tax rates, will be subject to
the relatively high marginal tax rates. The argument is that if
tax expenditure is to be used, a credit is the superior approach
from the perspective of distributive justice. This argument has
been made, for example, in connection with the charitable
contribution deduction. Some commentators have complained
that the charitable deduction, because it is more valuable to
higher-bracket taxpayers, disproportionately benefits the
charities preferred by high-income individuals.1 7°
Others
contend, however, that the force of that objection depends on
who tends to benefit from the charities in question.
For
example, it has been argued that the charities preferred by
high-bracket taxpayers tend to provide more in the way of
public goods to society than the charities preferred by lower
income donors. High-income taxpayers tend to give more to
educational institutions and hospitals, whereas, low-income
taxpayers tend to give more to religious organizations. The
argument is that educational institutions and hospitals provide
more public goods per dollar received than religious
organizations, which are primarily devoted to serving the
interests of their donors. Thus, it has been argued that even if
switching from a charitable deduction to a charitable credit
could be designed to maintain the same overall level of
charitable giving, such a change likely would substantially alter
the distribution of gifts-a big increase for religious institutions
at the expense of educational institutions and hospitals.171
Whether or not this defense of the charitable deduction is
persuasive, it seems unlikely to move anyone as a defense of a
life-insurance subsidy that disproportionately benefits the
170 See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 362 (1980); CLOTFELTER, supra note 152, at 103-04.

Martin Feldstein, The Income Tax and Charitable Contributions: Part I - Aggregate
and Distributional Effects, 28 NAT'L TAXJ. 81 (1975); Martin Feldstein, The Income
Tax and Charitable Contributions: Part II The Impact on Religious, Educational, and
Other Organizations, 28 NAT'L TAX }. 209 (1975).
171

-
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households of high-income families.
In sum, unless an argument can be made that a price
subsidy skewed in favor of high-income families 1s
appropriate, a credit would seem superior to a deduction on
fairness grounds. Therefore, the only possible argument in
favor of the deduction would be that a different approach to
the problem is being used for low-income households-namely,
These benefits
government-provided survivorship benefits.
replace a much larger fraction of income for the lowest-income
households as compared with the highest-income households.
And the choice of direct government provision for low-income
households with a deduction-price-subsidy for higher income
households might be justified on the 'bang-for-the-buck' price
elasticity theory mentioned earlier. The best way of achieving
intra-family generational equity in a relatively high-income
household might be the use of a deduction, because relatively
high-income individuals tend to have the higher price
elasticities of giving.172 The best way of achieving intra-family
generational equity within relatively low-income households
therefore might be government provided survivorship
benefits.173

c. Accuracy vs. Complexity
Finally, there is the lingering question of fine-tuning-that
is, whether it would be worthwhile to target the subsidy by, for
example, varying the amount of available deduction or credit
on the basis of the number of dependents living in, and/ or the
net worth of, each household. For example, on the theory that
net worth tends to rise with age for most people (and thus-all
else equal-life insurance need tends to diminish), we might
Another response to the distributional concern raised by the use of a
deduction would be to increase marginal tax rates on upper-income households.
The rate increase would not only respond to distributional concerns raised by the
new deduction but would actually enhance the deduction's desired substitution
effect. Of course, raising marginal rates would also exacerbate other undesired
substitution effects, which would have to be weighed in the balance.
1 73 Of course, with really low-income households, it is not so much intra-family
generational equity that concerns us, but rather inter-family equity. That is why
we have the progressive income-tax rate structure in the first place. Therefore, if
survivorship benefits are to be retained as the principal means of dealing with
the underinsurance problem in low-income households, we need to rethink the
fundin� mechanism. Currently, survivorship benefits are funded by a highly
regressive payroll tax. We should consider changing the system so that tfte
revenue source for survivorship benefits is collected in a more progressive
manner.
172
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allow a one hundred percent premium deduction for
households in which the primary taxpayer is twenty-five years
or younger and then phase the deduction out gradually until it
is eliminated for taxpayers who are forty-five or fifty-five or
whatever age is chosen.174 Similarly, the percentage of
premium that is deductible could be linked to the number of
dependents within the household: the more children or other
dependents living within the household, the greater the
insurance deduction. Some households-maybe single-person
households with no dependents or households with net worth
above a certain amount-would be entitled to no insurance
deduction whatever. The precise details of such a rule, and
whether extensive fine-tuning would be worth the cost, are
beyond the scope of the current analysis.

E.

Existing Tax Subsidies for Life Insurance

The analysis of this Part has led to the conclusion that, in
response to the problem of inadequate life-insurance coverage
in this country, some form of demand-side tax subsidy may be
a desirable supplement to the existing social security
survivorship program. The issue to which I now turn is the
extent to which the existing demand-side tax expenditures for
life insurance-the exclusion for employer provided insurance
and the treatment of cash value life insurance-serve this
function. In one sense, the obvious answer is no, given that the
existing
empirical
research
indicates
substantial
underinsurance notwithstanding the existence of the existing
tax subsidies. Therefore, one general recommendation, which
will be expanded upon in the subsections that follow, would be
to make these tax subsidies more generous than they currently
are.

1.

The Exclusion for

$50,000 of Employer-Provided Coverage

That suggestion would apply perhaps least controversially
to the existing income tax exclusion for employer-provided
group term coverage. That exclusion, which applies to the

It is possible that a one hundred percent premium deduction might not be a
sufficiently generous starting point for the phasedown. For example, depending
on the elasticity of demand for life insurance, it might be that a one hundred fiffy
percent or two hundred percent deduction would be the appropriate starting
point. See supra discussion of double-deduction proposal in charitable giving the
context.
1 74
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premiums paid by an employer on behalf of an employee to
purchase up to $50,000 of group term coverage on the
employee's life, represents a clear (albeit small) step in the
general direction suggested by the analysis of this Part.
Inherent in the exclusion, of course, are implicit assumptions
along the lines described above in subsection A of this Part.
Except for the fact that we are using an exclusion (which ties
the subsidy's MRR to the taxpayer's marginal tax rate, which in
turn is tied to income level), we have chosen not to fine-tune
the subsidy to target the households most likely to be
underinsured.
In addition, we have capped the subsidy
arbitrarily at $50,000 of coverage, presumably not because we
think that all employees tend to underconsume life insurance
by precisely the amount of $50,000, but because $50,000 is a
nice round number that fits within the existing revenue
constraints at the time of enactment. A reform of this rule,
which the analysis of this article suggests, would be to expand
the existing exclusion to cover employer-provided group term
coverage up to an amount that roughly equals the amount by
which most households tend to underinsure. Again, this is
where additional theoretical and empirical work is needed.
Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, consider the following
proposal: provide an exclusion for employer-provided group
term life insurance coverage up to five, seven, or ten times the
employee's annual income. Then choose one of those annual
income multiples and apply the same rule to everyone, or have
different multiples apply to
employees
in
different
circumstances-with relatively high multiples applying to
younger employees and low multiples applying to older ones.
Some employers already offer such life-insurance options as
benefits to their employees, and many employees take full
advantage of the provision, maxing out the amount of
employer-provided coverage, even though only the first
$50,000 of coverage is tax-free. But many employers do not;
and where such plans are offered, many employees fail to take
maximal advantage of them. Increasing the amount subject to
the exclusion, along the lines just described, might be enough
to encourage the desired level of insurance. Whether such a
change would be worth the cost in terms of tax revenue is
precisely
the
sort of question that requires further
investigation.
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The Tax Treatment of Cash Value Life Insurance

The other primary tax expenditure for life insurance that can
be found in current law, which again is much larger in magnitude
than the group-term-insurance exclusion just discussed, is the set
of rules governing the tax treatment of cash value life insurance.
1 75
The following summary captures the gist of those rules.
If an
individual purchases a cash value life insurance policy (which is a
contract that combines pure term life insurance and an investment
vehicle into one product), the accrued earnings in the investment
side of the policy-sometimes called the "inside buildup"-are not
taxed unless and until the policy is partially or wholly surrendered.
And even then, those investment earnings get preferential
treatment. For example, upon surrender of the policy, gains are
taxed only to the extent they exceed the "total policy costs," which
includes the actuarial costs and the loading charges. Also, the
taxpayer is allowed to recover these costs on a first-in/first-out
basis. What is more, given the availability of policy loans (under
which insureds can borrow part or all of the inside buildup without
causing a realization event) and the exclusion for life insurance
proceeds paid out upon the death of the insured, it is possible for
cash value policyholders virtually to eliminate rather than just
defer taxation on investment earnings accumulated inside a cash
value insurance policy.
These rules create an obvious tax preference for cash value
life insurance products. More precisely, they create a preference
for combining one ' s life insurance and one 's investments into a
single "bundled" product rather than separating or "unbundling"
those transactions though an approach that is sometimes referred to
as the "buy term and invest the rest" (BTIR) . If an insured
investor uses the unbundled approach, the earnings on the
investments may not get the same tax-favored treatment as they
would inside a cash value policy. Thus, for those taxpayers who
have the resources and the desire to insure and invest, the cash
value rules can be understood as subsidizing the decisions both to
insure one ' s life and to save for future consumption, so long as the
two are done together. Indeed, these two policy objectives-the
need to encourage the purchase of life insurance and the need to
175 For summaries of the cash value rules, see U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, TAX
PouCY: TAX TREATMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE AND ANNUITY ACCRUED INTEREST,
(1990) [hereinafter GAO Report]; and Andrew D. Pike, Reflections on the Meaning
of Life: An Analysis of Section 7702 and the Taxation of Cash Value Life Insurance, 42
fAX L. REV. 491 (1998).
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encourage long-term savings-are o ffered as the only plausible
j ustification for the cash value rules by everyone who has written
on the subject, critics as well as defenders.
These rules have been the subj ect of several extremely critical
studies.176 All of those studies implicitly or explicitly agree with
the assumption that the principal justification for the cash value
rules is the problem of underinsurance. However, each of the
studies either explicitly concludes or strongly implies that the cash
value rules should be repealed altogether. The main reason given
for that conclusion is that the cash value rules primarily, and
unjustifiably, benefit high-income individuals. These studies also
recommend that, at the very least, the tax treatment of inside
buildup should be amended to be more consistent with the current
tax treatment of other types of long-term investing. Thus, with that
goal in mind, two recommendations are commonly made: 1) policy
loans should give rise to taxation of inside buildup with perhaps a
penalty tax to boot (as is currently done with other tax-favored
retirement accounts); and 2) the first-in/first-out basis-recovery
rule for cash surrenders (to be contrasted with loans) should be
repealed and replaced with a rule similar to the one that applies to
annuities or stocks, where basis recovery is less "accelerated."
I am no fan of the cash value rules. They are among the most
complicated provisions in the tax code, and they do not seem to
have made much of a dent in the underinsurance problem. Indeed,
despite all of the tax advantages provided to those who adopt the
bundled approach, the BTIR approach still dominates the
market. 1 77 Moreover, there is little doubt that the cash value rules
do not create an ideal response to the underinsurance problem.
Any version of the deduction, exclusion, or credit proposals
mentioned in the previous sections of this Part would probably be a
better approach, if for no other reason than their relative simplicity.
Nevertheless, if those rules are to be retained as the principal
existing tax subsidy for life insurance (as seems likely to happen),
176

See, e.g., GAO Report, supra note 175; DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO THE
CONGRFSS ON THE TAXATION OF LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY PRODUCTS, (1990)
[hereinafter Treasury Report); See also Pike, supra note 175. The influence of the
Pike article can be seen throughout both the GAO Report and the Treasury
Report.
177 Cash-value policies represented 66.3 percent and term policies 33.6 percent of
the total new policies sola in 1997. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, LIFE
INSURANCE FACT BOOK 7 (1998). When the statistic is "life insurance in force"
rather than new policies issued, term insurance still dominates both in terms of
policies issued and face amounts of coverage. Id. at 8.
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consider the following tentative observations.
First, a case can be made that, contrary to the conclusions of
previous studies, the cash value rules should be made more
178
generous to taxpayers, not less.
Those studies have emphasized
the ways that the cash value rules tend to favor savings that are
bundled within a cash value policy, thus creating a "distortion" in
favor of doing one's savings through the bundled approach rather
than any number of BTIR approaches. However, that is precisely
the point of the bundled subsidy. It is the nature of such a subsidy
that the after-tax return to savings in the bundled form will
outperform the savings in the unbundled form. Otherwise, there is
no subsidy. Because many other tax expenditure �rovisions exist
79
that favor savings outside of cash value policies,
perhaps the
180
cash value rules should be made more generous.
Second, perhaps the most interesting aspect of the cash value
subsidy is the conventional wisdom among financial advisors that
it is a "bad buy," and that the unbundled approach is generally
better. What is the source of the negative views of cash value
insurance? It stems from beliefs about how cash value insurance
works in the real world. The claim is that, although cash value
insurance may be a great deal in theory, in reality the tax benefits
of most policies are more than outweighed by hidden
181
administrative costs.
However, this claim presents a further
puzzle: given that cash value insurance is, in theory, nothing more
than two
separate
financial
products-life
insurance and
178 Previous studies have universally called for cutting back on the tax
advantages provided in the cash value rules. See, e.g., GAO Report, supra note
1 75, at 3 and Pike, supra note 175, at 525-35.
179 To take one example, consider the income tax treatment of state supervised
pre-paid tuition plans. See I.RC. 529. Under those plans, taxpayers can invest for
their children's college education in a highly tax-favored manner, without
having to buy any life insurance whatsoever. See generally www.tiaa
cref.org/tuition/index.tlml (explaining 529 college savings plans; The 529
Solution, MONEY MAGAZINE, May 2001. The availability of that option, however,
along with all the other tax-favored ways of investing, undermines the value of
the cash value subsidy, because the value of that subsidy is directly related to the
after-tax opportunity cost of the funds.
1so For example, the various reforms enacted in the 1980s designed to reduce the
amount of investment earnings that can be sheltered inside a cash value policy
could be repealed or at least revised. For a summary of those rules, see Treasury
Report, supra note 175.
1s1 This view has some weak support in the scholarl): insurance literature.
Antony C. Cherin & Robert C. Hutchins, The Rate oj �eturn on Universal Life
Insurance, 55 J. RisK & INS. 691 (1988); Richard B. Corbett & Jack M. Nelson, A
Comparison of Term Insurance Rates to Protection-Related Charges in Universal Life
Insurance, 59 J. RISK & INS. 470 (1992).
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investment-bundled together, why would the administrative costs
be higher for the bundled approach than for the unbundled
approach? Why would the difference in administrative costs be
large enough to offset the tax advantages of the .bundled approach?
If cash value insurance is, in fact, merely a bundled version of
BTIR, then in a competitive market, how could such large
differences in administrative costs persist? Why would they not be
competed away? Presumably, in a competitive market they would,
but therein lies the problem. The failure of cash value insurance to
clearly dominate its BTIR alternatives, to the extent explicable by
the higher administrative costs and loading charges associated with
the former, is partial evidence that the cash value market may be
less than fully competitive. This should be a concern-again, only
if the cash value subsidy is to be retained.
CONCLUSION
Why is the problem of underconsumption of life insurance
studied so little? The problems of inadequate private savings,
especially retirement savings, and inadequate health insurance
coverage have been the subject of countless studies and legislative
proposals. By contrast, the findings of the relatively few studies of
life-insurance adequacy that many households are significantly
underinsured have gone largely unnoticed by policymakers and
subsequent scholars. Why is that? Granted, the magnitude of the
life-insurance problem may be small in comparison with the
problem of inadequate retirement savings. Most households that
own term insurance policies never collect on those policies. This
is because most breadwinners live long enough that the household
becomes largely independent of the breadwinner' s human capital,
and the policies are allowed to lapse. Children grow up and move
out on their own, and families eventually accumulate sufficient
non-life-contingent assets-household savings plus Social S ecurity
entitlements-to provide for the financial needs of surviving
spouses. After all, premature death is a rare event by definition; so
we should not expect it to be a "front burner" issue for most people
most of the time.
Still, the level of underinsurance documented in the Bernheim
study discussed in Part II is not trivial. If underinsurance were
truly as "widespread" as it suggest, one would expect more public
concern about the question. Perhaps it will come as the study gets
play in the academic community, but that is doubtful. As reflected
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in Part I, there remains a great deal of uncertainty about the central
assumption on which all of the existing empirical studies have
been based: that the optimal or correct amount of life insurance
entails an amount of coverage necessary to leave the dependent
with the same consumption power he or she had when the
breadwinner was alive.
Even if we could agree on that
assumption, there would remain the equally difficult and equally
important question of what constitutes "maintaining the household
standard o f living."
Consider, for example, the response I received upon asking a
friend how much life insurance a household should buy: "Enough
so that the breadwinner' s dependents would not be left destitute,
but probably no more than that." A number of others to whom I
have put this question have expressed similar opinions.
One
colleague even went so far as to suggest that he wanted to arrange
his affairs so that when he died his family would actually be a little
worse off financially as a result, so that they would be sure to
experience regret. In other words, he did not want them dancing
on his grave. The life insurance decision is a complex one, no
doubt. The living-standard-maintenance baseline may not be for
everyone, even if it can be given some content in particular
However, my concern is that the impossibility of
contexts.
identifying a single correct formula for determining life-insurance
adequacy will serve to justify a lack of introspection and a lack of
intra-household communication, such as between spouses, and on a
regular basis, about what the household' s actual life insurance
needs are, problems that easily can be made worse by the sort of
market failures (for lack of a better term) described in Part II.B
above.
With this concern in mind, consider one other anecdote that
arises out of my research for this article. In getting comments on
earlier drafts, the initial reaction, especially from colleagues with
economics or business backgrounds, has often been decisive and
adamant: I have gotten this all wrong-exactly backwards, in fact.
The life insurance market is one that should be expected to work
especially well. Life insurance contracts are quite simple and easy
to understand-at least that is the case with term insurance
policies.
Therefore, consumers should have no difficulty
understanding and evaluating the various alternatives. In addition,
the market seems especially competitive, given the price wars
being waged over the Internet.
Moreover, the laundry list of
market-failure rationales described in part II.B . (adverse selection,
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externalities, myopia, and intra-household agency problems) just
do not ring true. Ironically, however, a few of those same critics
have come b ack to me and, without backing down one bit from
their assessment of the paper, have confessed that, upon reflection
(and after discussion of the matter with their spouses), it occurs to
them that p ersonally they are in fact woefully underinsured, a fact
that they admit had not occurred to them until after they had read
this article. Therefore, even if this article does not lead to policy
changes of the sort described in Part III, perhaps it will help to
encourage more careful assessments of household insurance needs
among its audience by prompting a discussion of the life insurance
adequacy question.

